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NOTES

STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, MULTIPLE
DEFENDANTS, AND FULL RECOVERY OF
DAMAGES IN TORT LIABILITY FOR THE
• TRANSMISSION OF HUMAN
IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS
I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) was only first identified in the early 1980s,1 90,000 cases
have already been reported in the United States, with at least an
additional 50,000 cases documented in 114 other countries. 2 Predic1. See NEw

YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, ACQUIRED

DROME: 100 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 7 (1987)

IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYN-

[hereinafter 100 QUESTIONS] (reporting that

the disease was first identified in the United States in 1981). Five cases of Pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia were found among sexually active homosexual men and reported by the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) on June 5, 1981. Imperato, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-1987, 87 N.Y. ST. J. (IED. 251, 251 (1987). These cases were linked to a cellularimmune dysfunction which enhanced the chances of opportunistic infection. Id. Subsequently,
the disease "was found among other 'at risk' groups, including intravenous (IV) drug users,
recent Haitian immigrants, hemophiliacs, sexual partners of those who had the disease, recipients of blood transfusions, and infants of mothers with the disease or at risk for it." Id. By late
1982, the CDC had "promulgated a surveillance definition for AIDS. The epidemic was underway." Id. (footnote omitted).
2. See AIDS Still Increasing in U.S., But Rate Slows, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1989, at
A28, col. 1 [hereinafter AIDS Still Increasing] (reporting 90,990 cases of AIDS in the United
States); see also BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 113 (109 ed. 1989) (indicating that as of September 1988, there were

73,394 cases of AIDS in the United States and of this amount, 66,951 were male and 6,442
were female); AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: 1988
Update, 38 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 2, 3 (Mar. 12, 1989) (No. s-4) [hereinafter 1988 Update] (indicating that as of December 31, 1988, there were 82,764 cases of
AIDS in the United States which were reported to the CDC); cf. Swenson, Plagues, History,
and AIDS, THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR, Spring 1988, at 183, 183 (indicating that as of September 1987 there were 40,000 cases of AIDS in the United States and 50,000 cases in other
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tions about the future growth rate of AIDS infection vary, with the
Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta predicting 270,000 cases in
the United States by 19913 and other commentators suggesting as
many as 500,000 cases by 1991. 4 In fact, as many as 1.5 million
Americans may be infected with human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV), the virus that can ultimately lead to AIDS.' AIDS is usually
fatal-fifty-eight percent of those diagnosed with the disease have
already died.6 The death rate increases to seventy percent, for victims diagnosed two years ago or more. 7 Individuals presently diagnosed with AIDS include homosexual, heterosexual, and bisexual
men; women; and children." Given the pervasive effect of AIDS, it is
countries). As of June 8, 1987, 33,500 men, 2,500 women, and 511 children had been diagnosed with AIDS in the United States. 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 1, at 7.

3. Swenson, supra note 2, at 193; accord U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,

SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME

6 (1986) [here-

inafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT] (predicting 270,000 cases of AIDS and 179,000 total
deaths by 1991).

4. See W. MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, CRISIS: HETEROSEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE AGE OF AIDS 15 (1988) (predicting 500,000 American AIDS cases by the end of
1991, with more than 300,000 deaths); PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN
IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC xvii (1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N] (reporting that "[r]ecent estimates suggest that almost 500,000 Americans will have died or
progressed to later stages of the disease by 1992."); cf.Swenson, supra note 2, at 193 (citing
estimates as high as 350,000 cases by 1991).
These estimates are staggering enough, but even more devastating figures have been projected: "By the year 2,000, unless astonishing progress is made in the development of a vaccine
to prevent this infection, there will be a cumulative total of 5 million cases of AIDS in
America alone. Worldwide there will be 25 million cases." W. MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R.
KOLODNY, supra, at 16.
5. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 4, at xvii; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT,
supra note 3, at 12; Quarterly Report of the Domestic Policy Council on the Prevalence and
Rate ofSpread of HIV and AIDS-United States, 260 J. A.M.A. 1845, 1851 (1988) (supporting the CDC estimate that 1.0 million to 1.5 million people are currently infected); see also
Infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (explaining the progression of AIDS, including the
implications of HIV).
6. See 1988 Update, supra note 2, at 3 (reporting that of the 82,764 known AIDS cases
in the United States, more than 46,000 have been fatal, the equivalent of 56% and noting that
85% of those diagnosed before 1986 are reported to have died); 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 1,
at 10 (citing a 58% death rate); AIDS Still Increasing, supra note 2, at A28, col. 1 (noting
that 52,435 of the 90,990 known AIDS victims in the United States have died, the equivalent
of 58%); cf.SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 12 (indicating that "[tihe number
of persons known to have AIDS in the United States to date is over 25,000; of these, about
half have died of the disease.").
7. See 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 1, at 10; cf. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra
note 3, at 12 (concluding that those AIDS victims who have not yet died are expected to
eventually die because there is no cure).
8. See Grady, Just How Does AIDS Spread?, TIME, Mar. 21, 1988, at 60 (noting that
although anal sex among homosexual men and needle sharing by drug addicts still account for
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not surprising that the disease has been compared to the Black
Death, the European epidemic of bubonic plague in the fourteenth
century.'
The rapid spread and devastating effects of AIDS can be expected to have profound sociological impact in the United States)10
These effects will inevitably reach into many areas of judicial and
legislative decision-making. 11 The number of legal issues that will be
affected by AIDS may be unlimited, but areas clearly implicated
include: constitutional law,1 2 criminal law, 13 educational opportunimost cases of transmission of AIDS, intravenous drug users or bisexual men who engage in
heterosexual intercourse also contribute to the spread of the disease); supra note 2 (reporting
the numbers of AIDS victims in each category).
9. See Swenson, supra note 2, at 183.
10. See generally Swenson, supra note 2, at 183-200 (examining the AIDS crisis by
reviewing previous epidemics and their sociological effects, analyzing the "sociological anatomy" of an epidemic and comparing the social responses to historical epidemics with responses
to the AIDS crisis).
Part of this sociological effect is certain to be found in the tremendous economic costs of
AIDS. In 1985, $630 million was spent in the United States on personal medical care costs for
AIDS, and $3.9 billion was estimated to have been lost as a result of victims' decreased productivity. Imperato, supra note 1, at 253. It has also been estimated that by 1991, the personal
medical care costs will rise to $8.5 billion, and productivity loss will rise to $55.6 billion. Id.
Additionally, "[n]onpersonal costs for research, education, screening, and general support services are expected to rise from $542 million for 1986 to $2.3 billion in 1991." Id.
11. See generally Gebbie, AIDS and Government: Regulation of Sexual Behavior, 57
UMKC L. REV. 251 (1989); Gostin & Ziegler, A Review of AIDS-Related Legislative and
Regulatory Policy in the United States, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 5 (1987); Law, Social Policy, and Contagious Disease: A Symposium on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 14 HOFSTRA L. REV 1 (1985); Lewis, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome:
State Legislative Activity, 258 J.A.M.A. 2410 (1987); A Symposium on AIDS, 12 NOVA L.
REV.

961 (1988).

One example of the growth of legislative action centers on the increased funding for
AIDS research. Congress first allocated funds to AIDS research in 1984. AIDS Research Gets
the Grants, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 6, 1989, at 46. Since that time, federal spending has grown by
2,000%, from $61 million to $1.3 billion. Id. Additionally, $1.6 billion has been requested for
1990. Id.
Responses from state and local governments should also be anticipated. For example, New
York Governor Mario Cuomo recently unveiled a five-year New York state plan to combat
AIDS. See Lambert, Cuomo Sets AIDS Plan, Admitting It Falls Short, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,
1989, at BI, col. 5. The plan contains 200 proposals including: drafting certain laws barring
discrimination and providing for punitive damages, expanding drug treatment for addicts, approving 600 new hospital beds for AIDS patients, and providing additional funding for "preventive education, training for AIDS workers and epidemiological studies." Id. at B10, col. 6;
see also Fontana, The Ramifications of the AIDS Crisisfor Local Governments, 23 TORT &
INS. L.J. 195 (1988) (discussing various issues local governments must face in dealing with the
AIDS crisis).
12. See generally Albert, A Right to Treatmentfor AIDS Patients?,92 DICK. L. REV.
743 (1988); Hollowell & Eldridge, ConstitutionalLaw: Subsistence, Equal Opportunity, and
the Individual Diagnosed with HIV, 9 J.LEGAL MED. 561 (1988); Joseph, Civil Liberties in
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ties,' 4 employment discrimination,15 medical malpractice, 6 and tort
liability for the transmission of HIV. 17 The final category is particuthe Crucible: An Essay on AIDS and the Future of Freedom in America, 12 NOVA L. REV.
1083 (1988); Merrit, Communicable Disease and Constitutional Law: Controlling AIDS, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 739 (1986); Orland & Wise, The AIDS Epidemic: A Constitutional Conundrum, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 137 (1985); Rosoff, The AIDS Crisis: Constitutional Turning
Point?, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 80 (1987); Smith, Medicine and Law: AIDS, Constitutional Challenges to Tort Reform and Medical Malpractice, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 370
(1988); Spence, AIDS: Due Process, Equal Protection, and the Right to Treatment, 4 ISSUES
L. & MED. 283 (1988); Sullivan & Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139 (1988); Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1274 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Rights]; Note, Characterization
and Disease: Homosexuals and the Threat of AIDS, 66 N.C.L. REV. 226 (1987) (authored by
Thomas R. Mendicino) [hereinafter Note, Characterization and Disease]; Comment, The
Constitutional Implications of Mandatory Testing for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-AIDS, 37 EMORY L.J. 217 (1988) (authored by Susan J. Levy).
13. See generally Robinson, AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and
a New Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91 (1985); Sinkfield & Houser, AIDS and
the Criminal Justice System, 10 J. LEGAL MED. 103 (1989); Note, Criminal Liability for
Transmission of AIDS: Some Evidentiary Problems, 10 CRIM. JUST. J. 69 (1987) (authored by
Thomas Fitting); Note, Characterization and Disease, supra note 12, at 234-39.
14. See generally Keith, AIDS in the Classroom, 58 Miss. L.J. 349 (1988); Schwarz &
Schaffer, AIDS in the Classroom, 14 HOESTRA L. REV. 163 (1985); Comment, Enforcing the
Right to a Public Education for Children Afflicted With AIDS, 36 EMORY L.J. 603 (1987)
(authored by Leslie N. Brockman); Comment, AIDS-The Legal Implications, 9 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L,J. 641, 646 (1986-87) (authored by Frances Means) [hereinafter Comment,
Legal Implications]; Note, Discrimination in the Public Schools: Dick and Jane Have AIDS,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881 (1988) (authored by Susan A. Winchell).
15. See generally Brown, AIDS in the Workplace: A Legal Dilemma, 42 Sw. L.J. 837
(1988); Cohen & Cohen, AIDS in the Workplace: Legal Requirements and Organizational
Responses, 40 LAB. L.J. 411 (1989); Colosi, AIDS: Human Rights Versus the Duty to Provide
a Safe Workplace, 39 LAB. L.J. 677 (1988); Lawson, AIDS, Astrology, and Arline: Towards a
Causal Interpretation of Section 504, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 237 (1989); Leonard, AIDS and
Employment Law Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (1985); Lotito, AIDS in the Workplace:
A Practical Guide for Employers, 35 PRAC. LAW. 35 (1989); Napier, AIDS, Discrimination
and Employment Law, 18 INDUS. L.J. 84 (1989); Saad, AIDS-Legal Implications for the
Employer, 66 MICH. B.J. 164 (1987); Schmall, AIDS in the Workplace: Doctors, Lawyers,
and Bosses, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 685 (1988); Steinhilber, AIDS and Employment: Legal and
Policy Considerations, 35 FED. B. NEWS & J. 377 (1988); Turner & Ritter, AIDS and Employment, 5 LAB. LAW. 83 (1989); Comment, Legal Implications, supra note 14, at 649.
16. See generally Hermann, AIDS: Malpractice and Transmission Liability, 58 U.
COLO. L. REV. 63 (1986-87); Smith, supra note 12, at 370; Spong, AIDS and The Health
Care Provider: Burgeoning Legal Issues, 67 MICH. B.J. 610 (1988); Note, The Conflict Between a Doctor's Duty to Warn a Patient's Sexual Partner That the Patient Has AIDS and a
Doctor's Duty to Maintain Patient Confidentiality, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 355 (1988)
(authored by Jill Suzanne Talbot); Comment, AIDS: Balancing the Physician's Duty to Warn
and Confidentiality Concerns, 38 EMORY L.J. 279 (1989) (authored by Charles D. Weiss);
Comment, Doctor-Patient Confidentiality Versus Duty to Warn in the Context of AIDS Patients and Their Partners, 47 MD. L. REV. 675 (1988) (authored by Judith C. Ensor).
17. See generally Baruch, AIDS in the Courts: Tort Liability for the Sexual Transmission of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 165 (1987); Corboy,
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larly expansive; commentators have already suggested potential

causes of action, including battery, 18 fraud and deceit,1 9 misrepresentation,20 and negligence.2
Legal Implications: The AIDS Crisis, 16 THE BRIEF 40 (10986); Hermann, supra note 16, at
63; Smith, supra note 12, at 370; Note, Viability of Negligence Actions for Sexual Transmission of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Virus, 17 CAP. U.L. REV. 101 (1987)
(authored by Regina DelaRosa); Note, You Never Told Me . . . You Never Asked; Tort
Liability for the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 91 DICK. L. REV. 529 (1986) (authored by
David P. Brigham) [hereinafter Note, You Never Told Me]; Note, Tort Liabilityfor AIDS?,
24 Hous. L. REV. 957 (1987) (authored by Robin Smith Fredrickson); Note, To Have and to
Hold: The Tort Liability for the Interspousal Transmission of AIDS, 23 NEw ENG. L. REV.
887 (1988-89) (authored by Robert B. Gainer) [hereinafter Note, Interspousal Transmission];
Note, Negligence as a Cause of Action for Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 19 U. TOL L. REV.
923 (1988) (authored by Bonnie Elber) [hereinafter Note, Negligence]; Note, Tort Liability
for the Transmission of the AIDS Virus: Damagesfor Fear of AIDS and ProspectiveAIDS,
45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185 (1988) (authored by John Patrick Darby) [hereinafter Note,
Tort Liability]; Comment, AIDS-Liability for Negligent Sexual Transmission, 18 CuMB. L.
REV. 691 (1988) (authored by Deane Kenworthy Corliss) [hereinafter Comment, AIDS Liability]; Comment, Legal Implications, supra note 14, at 651; Comment, The Dirt of the Clean
Hands Doctrine, 56 UMKC L. REV. 791 (1988) (authored by Mark Wilkerson) [hereinafter
Comment, Clean Hands Doctrine].
18. See Baruch, supra note 17, at 176 (arguing that where a defendant was "substantially certain that the spread of the disease would result from his conduct" and sexually transmitted AIDS, the elements of intent and offensive contact would both be fulfilled); Hermann,
supra note 16, at 89-91 (comparing battery for AIDS transmission to cases involving other
sexually transmitted diseases); Note, You Never Told Me, supra note 17, at 535-37 (noting
that the defendant who knew he had AIDS would be liable for battery, but distinguishing the
situation where the defendant was not aware of his infection, and therefore could not be held
liable); Note, Tort Liability for AIDS?, supra note 17, at 987-88 (predicting that a case of
intentional AIDS transmission is unlikely to occur, and concluding that "unless the court
chooses to infer the AIDS carrier defendant's intent from the sexual act and resulting injury,
this action may prove difficult to sustain."); Note, Interspousal Transmission, supra note 17,
at 897 (arguing that battery can be used as a cause of action where the defendant is married
to the plaintiff); cf. Comment, Clean Hands Doctrine, supra note 17, at 792-93 (discussing
battery claims for herpes transmission).
19. See Note, Tort Liability for AIDS?, supra note 17, at 984-87 (discussing the elements of fraud and deceit, and noting that "similar causes of action have been sustained for
the concealment of a contagious disease."); Note, Interspousal Transmission, supra note 17,
at 894 (discussing fraudulent transmission of AIDS between married parties). But see Baruch,
supra note 17, at 178-79 (arguing that a deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation claim
presented exclusively would be "too risky" because the plaintiff would have to prove each
element "by a clear and convincing evidence standard, rather than the normal and less burdensome preponderance of the evidence standard.").
20. See Baruch, supra note 17, at 176-79 (comparing and analyzing claims for negligent
misrepresentation and claims for fraudulent misrepresentation); Hermann, supra note 16, at
91 (indicating one advantage of misrepresentation would be the possible imposition of punitive
damages, whereas simple negligence would not support such recovery); Comment, Clean
Hands Doctrine, supra note 17, at 793-94 (explaining that the misrepresentation might come
about in "the form of a false statement in response to direct inquiry [or] through intentional
concealment of the fact that one is infected.").
21. See generally Baruch, supra note 17, at 173-75; Hermann, supra note 15, at 89;
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This Note focuses on the issue of potential negligence suits
against defendants who were unaware of their infection at the time
they sexually transmitted HIV. Causes of action for negligence have
traditionally been recognized for other sexually transmitted diseases,
including gonorrheal' and herpes.2 3 The negligence suit for HIV
transmission, while similar in general concepts, presents interesting
and critical questions about the application of traditional tort law.
These questions stem from several unique characteristics of the disease itself. The road from HIV infection to the development of
AIDS has an unknown, but potentially lengthy, incubation period
during which the infected party may not know that he or she has the
disease, although the viris can still be transmitted to other persons.24
The incubation period presents problems in tracing the source of the
infection, demonstrating the source's negligence, and proving that
the victim was not participating in high risk conduct.2 5
Three distinct questions about tort liability for HIV transmission can be isolated. First, what should be the acceptable standard of
conduct for a person who is not aware that he or she has HIV, but
Note, You Never Told Me, supra note 17, at 542-49; Note, Tort Liability for AIDS?, supra
note 17, at 967; Note, Interspousal Transmission, supra note 17 at 902-08; Note, Negligence,
supra note 17, at 928-41; Comment, AIDS Liability, supra note 16, at 691; Comment, Clean
Hands Doctrine, supra note 17, at 794-95.
For a discussion of the elements of a negligence claim and their application to an AIDS
transmission case, see infra notes 61-99 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Duke v, Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863
(1979) (restating the general rule that "[o]ne who negligently exposes another to an infectious
or contagious disease, which such other person thereby contracts, can be held liable in damages for his actions."). See generally Annotation, Tort Liability for Infliction of Venereal
Disease, 40 A.L.R. 4TH 1089, 1094 (1985) (discussing the negligence cause of action for venereal disease transmission).
23. See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989) (holding that "one
who knows, or should know, that he or she is infected with genital herpes is under a duty to
either abstain from sexual contact with others or, at least, to warn others of the infection prior
to having contact with them."); B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 143, 538 A.2d 1175, 1179 (1988)
(holding that the defendant, who knew about his infection, had a "duty either to refrain from
sexual contact with [the plaintiff] or to warn her of his condition."); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428
N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (sustaining a cause of action against the plaintiff's
former wife for negligent transmission of herpes); Maharam v. Maharam, 123 A.D.2d 165,
170-71, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (1st Dep't 1986) (recognizing a cause of action in negligence
where a husband did not disclose to his wife the fact that he was infected with herpes).
24. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
25. Dickens, Legal Rights and Duties in the AIDS Epidemic, 239 SCIaNca 580, 583
(1988) (explaining that "[t]he long incubation period of AIDS may obstruct the tracing of an
alleged source and make it difficult to establish that party's wrongful nondisclosure or failure
to follow prudent sexual behavior, or the plaintiff's seronegativity prior to the sexual encounter
and low-risk conduct thereafter.").
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participates in activities (particularly intravenous drug use or sexual
contact with multiple homosexual partners) that create a high risk of
infection?26 The second issue, raised by the fact that many people
who have AIDS engage or have engaged in sex with multiple partners and/or share or have shared needles with other intravenous
drug users,27 is whether the theory of "alternative liability" can be
used to shift the burden of proof to multiple defendants who are all
possible sources of the HIV infection.2 8 Third, given the potentially
long incubation period between infection and the outbreak of symptoms, 29 how will statutes of limitations affect the plaintiff's ability to
fully recover his or her damages? °
This Note reviews the medical facts about AIDS31 and the
structure of a "typical" negligence suit for sexual transmission of
HIV,3 2 observing areas where the above issues appear, and analyzing
them in detail. 3 Finally, this Note examines defenses to the AIDS
lawsuit and further complications involved with such a cause of
action.34
II.

THE MEDICAL FACTS

AIDS35
HIV,"6

is the final stage of an infection which is caused by
an RNA containing retrovirus, which becomes incorporated

26. See infra notes 100-38 and accompanying text.
27. See 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 1, at 2-3 (citing needle sharing and increased promiscuous sexual conduct as increasing the risk of AIDS).
28. See infra notes 139-83 and accompanying text (discussing the alternative liability
rule and how it would be applied in an AIDS transmission suit).
29. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 184-203 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 35-60 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 61-99 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 100-203 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 204-60 and accompanying text.
35. For a more complete review of the medical facts about AIDS, see generally G.
ANTONIO, THE AIDS COVER-UP? 5-31 (1987); A. CANTWELL, AIDS: THE MYSTERY AND THE
SOLUTION (1986); SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-27; Fauci, The Human
Immunodeficiency Virus: Infectivity and Mechanisms of Pathogenesis, 239 SCIENCE 617
(1988); Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery of a New Disease, in AIDS AND THE LAW 17
(1987); Sicklick & Rubinstein, A Medical Review of AIDS, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv.5 (1985).
36. HIV is a generic term used to denote the causative agent of AIDS. Imperato, supra
note 1, at 251. The human retrovirus in question has been given a number of different names,
"including LAV (lymphadenopathy-associated virus), HTLV-III (human T-cell lymphotropic
virus type III), and ARV (AIDS-associated retrovirus)." Id. The focus of AIDS policy-making
should be on HIV infection:
The term "AIDS" is obsolete. "HIV infection" more correctly defines the problem.
The medical, public health, political, and community leadership must focus on the
full course of HIV infection rather than concentrating on later stages of the disease
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within the chromosome of an infected cell, multiplies, and impairs
the immune system, ultimately allowing other infections to occur far
more frequently than normal, with devastating effects 3 7 Although
infected and capable of transmitting HIV, the victim may take years
to develop AIDS because of the unusual incubation period involved,
or he may never develop any symptoms. 8 The virus is most com(ARC and AIDS). Continual focus on AIDS rather than the entire spectrum of
HIV disease has left our nation unable to deal adequately with the epidemic.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 4, at xvii; see also Revision of the CDCSurveillance Case
Definitionfor Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 3S (1987) (examining the newly revised CDC case definition for surveillance of AIDS,
which focuses on HIV infection).
37. See W. MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, supra note 4, at 18-19 (discussing
HIV infection); Swenson, supra note 2, at 190 (tracing the progression from HIV infection to
AIDS). Symptoms that must be documented to support a diagnosis of AIDS include: opportunistic infections which occur by organisms that would not usually cause disease; Kaposi's sarcoma, a malignant skin lesion; and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma of high grade pathogenicity.
Sicklick & Rubinstein, supra note 36, at 5.
One United States district court described the effect of the AIDS virus within its findings
of fact:
When the virus enters the body it begins to attack certain white blood cells (Tlymphocytes), which are an integral part of the human immune system. Specifically,
the disease destroys, and generates qualitative abnormalities, in the victim's Thelper/inducer cells, which enable other components of the immune system to function. The virus thereby weakens the victim's immune system.
Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1529 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
38. The progression of the HIV infection is a difficult but vital component in the understanding of AIDS. Although infected with HIV, the victim may never develop AIDS or any
symptoms. See 100 QUESTIONs, supra note 1, at 9 (reporting that "[o]nly about 20 percent of
those infected by the virus have so far developed the severe and fatal form of the disease which

is called AIDS.");

SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT,

supra note 3, at 12 (noting that "[t]he ma-

jority of infected antibody positive individuals who carry the AIDS virus show no disease
symptoms and may not come down with the disease for many years, if ever.").
Because visible symptoms do not necessarily exist, the majority of those who are HIV
infected are unaware that they carry the virus. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 4, at

xvii (predicting that "[o]ne to 1.5 million Americans are believed to be infected with the
human immunodeficiency virus but are not yet ill enough to realize it."). However, these victims can still transmit the disease. See 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that HIV
carriers may be unaware of their infection, but capable of transmitting the virus); cf. Surgeon
General's Report, supra note 3, at 12 (warning that of the estimated 1.5 million infected

Americans, "[a]ll of these individuals are assumed to be capable of spreading the virus sexually (heterosexually or homosexually) or by sharing needles and syringes or other implements
for intravenous drug use.").
Typically, the first visible symptoms to develop include "fatigue, malaise, recurrent fever,
night sweats, diarrhea, anorexia, unexplained weight loss, generalized lymphadenopathy (swollen lymph glands) in the groin and neck, and an increased susceptibility to opportunistic infections with prolonged recovery." Corboy, supra note 17, at 40. These symptoms indicate that
the victim has developed AIDS-related complex (ARC). See id.; see also 100 QUESTIONS,
supra note I, at 10 (explaining that the ARC victim may die from those symptoms "without
ever developing full-blown AIDS."); SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 12 (esti-
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monly transmitted through anal intercourse or intravenous drug

use.39 The large majority of current AIDS victims are male.4 ° Thus
far, infectious quantities of the virus have only been found to exist in
mating that I00,1000 to 200,000 of those currently infected with HiV will develop ARC).
Finally, the victim may progress to "[t]he later stage of AIDS, commonly known as 'fullblown AIDS,'" which is "evidenced by Kaposi's sarcoma, a cancer that causes pink or purple
lesions and pneumocystis carinii, a pneumonia that may result in respiratory depression. Both
of these complications occur when the immune system is severely suppressed." Corboy, supra
note 17, at 40. Full-blown AIDS is not the most common result of HIV infection. See 100
QUESTIONS, supra note 1, at 10 (reporting that "ARC is three to five times more common than
AIDS."). The incubation period between HIV infection and the development of symptoms
may be quite long, with many varying estimates available. See PRESIDENTIAL COMI'N, supra
note 4, at 2 (estimating an average of eight years between HIV infection and the diagnosis of
AIDS); SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 12 (reporting that symptoms of ARC
or AIDS can take "as long as nine years to show up."); Barnes, AIDS: Statistics But Few
Answers, 236 SCIENCE 1423, 1424 (1987) (analyzing studies that show an increased risk of
developing AIDS as time progresses); Fauci, supra note 35, at 621 (predicting a time frame of
"up to 5 years or longer" between HIV infection and development of clinically detectable
symptoms); Imperato, supra note 1, at 251 (submitting evidence that "[t]he incubation period
varies from a minimum of a few months after exposure to several years."); Kolata, AIDS
Incubation Time Often Exceeds 9 Years, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1989, at B15, col. 5 (citing
research in San Francisco, which has "determined that 9.8 years is the median incubation
period, meaning half the men would develop the disease in less than that and half in a longer
time."); Silberner, Unlocking the Key to AIDS, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 29, 1988,
at 57 (suggesting a variable rate of incubation where some succumb quickly, while in others
the disease can remain dormant for years).
Even more startling than the length of time between infection and symptoms is the duration between infection and the ability to detect such infection. See Imagana, Lee, Wolinsky,
Sano, Morales, Kwok, Sninsky, Nishanian, Giorgi, Fahey, Dudley, Visscher & Detels, Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Type I Infection in Homosexual Men Who Remain Seronegativefor
ProlongedPeriods, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED 1458, 1458 (1989) (noting that "HIV-1 infection
in homosexual men at high risk may occur at least 35 months before antibodies to HIV-1 can
be detected."). For a discussion of AIDS testing, see infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
39. Grady, supra note 8, at 60; see also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at
13 (explaining that no known risk exists from casual contact with items such as "shared food,
towels, cups, razors, even toothbrushes . . ."). But see G. ANTONIO, supra note 35, at 95-124
(arguing that the evidence presently available does not support the conclusion that AIDS cannot be transmitted through casual contact).
In addition, the virus may be transmitted from pregnant women to their unborn children.
See Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1125, 1130 (1987). The virus "may be transmitted from infected women to their
offspring by three possible routes: [1] to the fetus in utero through the maternal circulation,
[2] to the infant during labor and delivery by inoculation or ingestion of blood and other
infected fluids, and [3] to the infant shortly after birth through infected breast milk." Id.
Interestingly, there is also a connection between the drug crack and AIDS. See Kerr,
Crack and Resurgence of Syphilis Spreading AIDS Among the Poor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20,
1989, at 1, col. 1. This is true because "[c]rack appears to stimulate pathological levels of
sexual activity." Id. Thus, heterosexual activity in crack houses "has become a significant avenue for the spread of AIDS." Id.
40. Grady, supra note 8, at 60 (concluding that males number 92% of American AIDS
victims).
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blood, semen, vaginal secretions, and breast milk.4 1 Accordingly, the
disease is relatively difficult to transmit, requiring either the exchange of a large volume of blood, or repeated exposure to smaller
volumes.42 Heterosexuals who do not associate with intravenous drug
users face an extremely small risk of infection. 43 Homosexual males
and intravenous drug users have been designated as "high risk
group" members because their practices involve semen-to-blood and
blood-to-blood contact which creates an increased risk of HIV transmission. 44 Blood donors in the United States are now screened for
41. Swenson, supra note 2, at 192. The HIV presence in vaginal secretions and breast
milk is "in smaller, but significant numbers." Id; see also Friedland & Klein, supra note 39, at
1130 (noting that HIV may be transmitted after birth through infected breast milk). HIV has
also been "found occasionally in small numbers in saliva, tears, urine, and amniotic fluid,
although clearly in numbers too small to transmit infection." Swanson, supra note 2, at 192.
42. Id. In a study of 97 female partners of 93 male AIDS victims, "[r]epeated exposures
to an infected partner represented a significant risk, whereas general sexual activity (as measured by number of sexual partners and number of sexually transmitted diseases) was not
associated with HIV infection." Padian, Male-to-Female Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 J. A.M.A. 788, 790 (1987).
43. Goode, I Love You, But Can I Ask a Question?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Feb, 22, 1988, at 85; see also Padian, supra note 42, at 790 (concluding that only one documented case exists of a single exposure transmission of AIDS from a male to a female). But
see W. MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, supra note 4, at 62 (concluding that "AIDS
infection is spreading beyond the original high-risk groups into the heterosexual population,
and the risk of becoming infected with HIV is higher for people with more numerous sexual
partners."); Heterosexuals Slow to Face the Reality of AIDS, 87 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 310 (1987)
(noting that not only can heterosexual transmission of HIV occur, but that "[i]n some regions
of the world, AIDS occurs with similar frequencies in both men and women.").
Although heterosexuals comprise only a minority of those infected with AIDS, the number of such cases seems to be growing at a higher rate than homosexual or intravenous (IV)
drug user cases. Id. (indicating a 200% growth rate in 1986 for heterosexuals, compared with
an 80% growth rate for the other two groups). In New York City, more than one-third of
AIDS victims deny homosexual activity. Des Jarlais, Intravenous Drug Use and the Heterosexual Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 87 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 283, 283
(1987) (commenting that as of-1986, 3,929 of the 7,696 AIDS victims in New York City
denied homosexual activity; more than half of these cases can be attributed to IV drug use).
For a discussion of IV drug use and its implications for heterosexual transmission of AIDS, see
Id,
Some attempts are being made to reduce the risk of IV transmitted AIDS. For example,
the Food and Drug Administration recently proposed the expansion of access to methadone.
Ingersoll, To Curb AIDS, U.S. Would Widen Methadone Access, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1989, at
B5, col. 1. Methadone has been offered to addicts because it can relieve the craving for heroin.
Id. Because methadone is taken orally, the use of needles would be reduced, as would the risk
of AIDS. Id. Under current rules, only patients in comprehensive treatment can be given the
drug. Id. The proposal would allow clinics to dispense methadone to addicts who were still on
waiting lists for comprehensive drug treatment. Id.
44. 100 QUESTION s, supra note 1,at 2. Persons with an increased risk of AIDS infection
include:
(1) homosexual and bisexual men; (2) present or past IV drug abusers; (3) persons

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol18/iss1/2

10

Schoenstein: Standards of Conduct, Multiple Defendants, and Full Recovery of D
1989]

HIV TRANSMISSION

the AIDS virus and all blood is tested for AIDS antibodies.", Therefore, the chances of a recipient contracting AIDS from a blood
transfusion have been substantially reduced.46
Government reports have stressed that the safest behavioral patterns, in terms of AIDS risks, consist of avoiding casual sexual relationships and multiple partners.4 7 The use of condoms has been advocated as a precautionary measure, despite the fact that estimates
concerning their effectiveness vary.48 Combining care in one's choice
with clinical or laboratory evidence of infection, such as those with signs or symptoms compatible with AIDS or AIDS-related complex (ARC); (4) persons born in
countries where heterosexual transmission is thought to play a major role; (5) male
or female prostitutes and their sex partners; (6) sex partners of infected persons or
persons at increased risk; (7) all persons with hemophilia who have received clotting-factor products; and (8) newborn infants of high-risk or infected mothers.
PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., AIDS: RECOMMENDATIONS

AND GUIDELINES; NOVEMBER 1982-DECEMBER 1987, at 13 (1988) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES].

One United States district court enunciated a slightly different list of high risk groups:
"1) homosexuals or bisexual men (73%), 2) hemophiliacs (1%), 3) transfusion recipients
(2%), 4) intravenous (IV) drug users (17%), 5) sexual partners of risk-group members (1%),
and 6) infants born to infected mothers (1%)." Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1530
(M.D. Fla. 1987) (citation omitted). In addition "[a]pproximately five percent (5%) of the
AIDS population does not fall into any of these groups .... " Id.
45. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 (explaining that each donor is
screened for AIDS, each blood donation is tested for AIDS antibodies, any blood that contains
antibodies is eliminated from transfusion or blood product use, and concluding that "[b]lood
banks are as safe as current technology can make them.").
46. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., UPDATE:
MMWR ARTICLES ON AIDS 3 (1988) [hereinafter MMWR ARTICLES] (noting a significant

reduction in new infections among transfusion recipients and hemophiliacs); SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 (estimating the chance of infected blood being utilized
before it can be tested positive for AIDS as "less than once in 100,000 donations."); Imperato,
supra note I, at 252 (finding that "[t]ransmission from high-risk-behavior groups via blood
transfusions will be minimal in the US given the relative safety of the blood supply.").
47. See 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 1, at 21 (recommending various precautions, including the avoidance of "sexual contact with multiple partners or with persons who have had
multiple partners."); see also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (advocating
"mutually faithful monogamous relationships").
In one study of the effect of sexual practices on the likelihood of HIV infection, only one
of 400 subjects claiming strict monogamy for the previous five years tested positive for HIV
antibodies. W. MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, supra note 4, at 56. In contrast, 10 of
200 men claiming an average of 9.8 sex partners in the previous five years tested positive, as
did 14 of the 200 women who claimed an average of 11.5 sex partners in the p:evious five
years. Id. at 55-56.
48. See RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES, supra note 44, at 14 (advocating condoms, but noting that "their efficacy in reducing transmission has not yet been proven."); cf
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 17 (recommending condom use despite the
unknown efficacy). But see W. MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, supra note 4, at 117
(concluding that "to think that condom use is perfect, or even near perfect, in eliminating the
risk of HIV transmission is foolishness of the highest order."); Carey, Condoms May Not Stop
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of sexual partners with condom use significantly reduces the risk of
AIDS infection."9
Two tests have been developed to indicate whether or not a per-

son has become infected. 50 The Enzymelinked Immunosorben Assay
(ELISA) determines whether HIV antibodies are present in the
blood stream, 51 since the presence of antibodies is an indication that
the person is infected with HIV. 52 In practice, however, it has been
estimated that as many as ninety percent of those who test positive
for antibodies are not really infected with the virus.53 Such results
are commonly referred to as "false positives." 54 If antibodies are present in two ELISA tests, the Western blot, a more expensive test
designed to "confirm or deny the presence of antibodies," will be
performed. 55 The Western blot test, however, is problematic for two
reasons. First, a growing number of inexperienced commercial laboratories are performing the testing, which may reduce the accuracy. 56 Second, confusion exists regarding the specific criteria that
denote a positive test result.57 Despite these problems, use of the two
tests in combination can achieve an accuracy level in excess of
ninety-nine percent. 58
AIDS, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 19, 1987, at 83 (commenting that a 10-15%
failure rate may be more problematic with AIDS than it is in pregnancy because while a
woman is only fertile 36 days a year, the AIDS carrier can transmit the disease every day).
Several recent studies have been done to determine the effectiveness of condom use as an
AIDS prevention technique. In one study testing 12 varieties of latex and natural-membrane
condoms, it was found that HIV could not pass through the latex, although occasional leaks
occurred in natural condoms. Goldsmith, Sex in the Age of AIDS Calls for Common Sense
and 'Condom Sense', 257 J. A.M.A. 2261, 2263 (1988).
49. Measured Danger, TIME, May 2, 1988, at 62 (indicating that "the chance of getting
AIDS ranges from 1 in 500 for a single act of intercourse with an infected partner when no
condom is used to 1 in 5 billion if a condom is used with a partner who has tested negative for
AIDS antibodies.").
50. Barnes, New Questions About AIDS Test Accuracy, 238 SCIENCE 884, 884-85
(1987).
51. W. MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, supra note 4, at 42; Proffit, The AIDS
Retrovirus, in AIDS: A HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 19, 21-23 (K. Blanchet ed.
1988); Barnes, supra note 50, at 884-85.
52. Barnes, supra note 50, at 884-85.
53. Id. at 885. But see MMWR ARTICLES, supra note 46, at 6 (noting that "[u]nder
ideal circumstances, the probability that a testing sequence will be falsely positive in a population with a low rate of infection ranges from less than I in 100,000 ... to an estimated 5 in
100,000," assuming that tests are repeated and that proper criteria are used for evaluation).
54. Barnes, supra note 50, at 885.
55. Id.; see also Proffitt, supra note 51, at 23-24 (discussing the Western blot test).
56. Barnes, supra note 50, at 885.
57. Id.
58. PRESIDENTIAL CoMM'N, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that "experts agree that the cur-
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Finally, it should be noted that there is no cure currently available for AIDS, 59 and the disease is invariably fatal. 60
rent sequence of tests used to detect antibody against HIV, when performed under well controlled conditions in good laboratories, yield both a sensitivity and spceificity of greater than
99.8 percent."); Barnes, supra note 50, at 885 (agreeing that the accuracy level is in excess of
99%).
A growing number of organizations, formerly opposed to AIDS testing, have begun to
advocate it. See Lambert, In Shift, Gay Men's Health Crisis Endorses Testing for AIDS
Virus, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 1. This trend reflects a decrease in fears about
testing accuracy, possible discrimination and emotional trauma. See id., col. 2.
The ultimate question from the AIDS litigants' standpoint will be whether courts accept
the test results. This may prove to be important in determining both the plaintiff's injury and
the fact that the defendant has AIDS. The Supreme Court of New York, in Albany County,
recently considered the effectiveness of AIDS testing in a suit challenging the legality of a
regulation that prohibited requiring AIDS testing in applications for health insurance. Health
Ins. Ass'n of America v. Corcoran, 531 N.Y.S.2d 456, 140 Misc. 2d 255 (Sup. Ct. 1988). The
court found that "testing for HIV sero positivity produces statistically valid basis for actuarial
risk classification purposes as an accurate, significant and substantial predictor of morbidity,
mortality and future medical expenses." Id. at 461, 140 Misc. 2d at 270.
59. 100 QuEsTioN s, supra note 1, at 11; see also Imperato, supra note 1, at 254 (analyzing a survey of 227 leading biomedical researchers and medical scientists which indicated
that only 19% thought AIDS could be eliminated by the year 2,000).
The recent development of the drug AZT has managed to prolong the lives of some AIDS
patients. See AZT Approved for Sale in Britain, 87 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 309 (1987) (reporting
that AZT has been approved for use in both the United States and Britain, but its long term
effects are not known at present); Making Do Without a Magic Bullet, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REPORT, Feb. 20, 1989, at 12 (discussing AZT and noting that AIDS patients in San Francisco now survive an average of 15 months after being diagnosed AIDS-positive, an increase
from an average of 10 months three years ago); cf. AIDS Patients Using AZT Usually Live
Much Longer, Wall St. J., June 7, 1989, at B4, col. 4 (noting the existence of reports of longer
survival for AIDS patients using AZT, but noting that some researchers have questioned
whether AZT alone should receive credit for such improvement). But see Chase, AIDS Patients Develop Viruses Resistant to AZT, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1989, at B1, col. 3 (noting that
some AIDS patients have apparently developed strains of the AIDS virus that are resistant to
AZT); cf.Silberner, supra note 38, at 56 (stating that AZT is the only drug currently available to treat AIDS, but it has serious side effects and is far from being a cure).
Additionally, recent developments in AIDS research continue to spark optimism that new
treatments might be found. See Silberner, supra note 24, at 56; see also New AIDS Drug to
Be Tested, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1989, at A14, col. 4 (noting the FDA has approved the
testing of a new drug, called GLQ223, which has destroyed cells infected with the AIDS virus
in laboratory tests); Schmeck, Structure of Enzyme in AIDS Virus is Identified, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 16, 1989, at BIO, col. 3 (suggesting some hope because "[s]cientists have determined the
complete three-dimensional structure of an enzyme of the AIDS virus, opening new possibilities for designing rugs to combat the deadly disease."). But see Waldholz, Tracking a Killer:
Merck Scientists Find a Chink in the Armor of the AIDS Virus, Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1989, at
Al, col. I (recognizin that "[r]esearchers are quick to say ... that it will be some time before
a drug that can inhibit the AIDS enzyme in humans is found-if, in fact, it ultimately is
found.").
60. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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NEGLIGENCE CASE

In order to sustain a suit in negligence, the plaintiff must show
four elements: a duty, recognized by law, to conform to a certain
standard of conduct; a failure on the defendant's part to conform to
that standard of care (i.e. a breach of that duty); a reasonably close
causal connection between the conduct and the injury (proximate
cause and cause in fact); and an injury denoted by actual loss or
damage to the victim. 6 ' Because there has been little judicial evaluation of the AIDS negligence claim, 6 2 the application of each element

to such a lawsuit should be examined.
A. Duty
A duty is a legally recognized obligation to conform to a certain
standard of conduct towards another person.13 Although a court may
61.

See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W.

KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed.

1984).

62. The Minnesota Court of Appeals examined a negligent AIDS transmission case in
the Spring of 1989. See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The court

upheld the trial court's determination that the defendant "was under no duty to warn appellant he had the AIDS disease because at the time of the parties' relationship it was not reasonably foreseeable that he had the disease or could cause appellant harm through intimate sexual
conduct." Id. at 444. This holding was reflective of the fact that at the time of the relationship
there was little information available about AIDS, id. at 9, and because there was little evidence that the defendant "had a history of homosexual activity." Id.
In another recent decision, a California trial court awarded Marc Christian $14.5 million
from the estate of his former lover, Rock Hudson. Rock Hudson's Lover Wins Suit, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 1989, at A22, col. 5. The jury decided that Rock Hudson and his former
secretary, Mark Miller, had conspired to keep Hudson's AIDS infection a secret from Christian, and that this constituted "outrageous conduct." Id. The award was $3.5 million more
than Christian had sought, despite the fact that he has yet to actually develop the disease. Id.;
see also Lovers, Liars and Other Strangers, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1989, at 61 (describing
Christian's claim that he had suffered "grave emotional distress"). Additionally, the jury
awarded Christian another $7.25 million in punitive damages. Hudson's Lover Wins $7 Million More, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1989, at A7, col. 3. Although the compensatory damages
were assessed both to Hudson's estate and Miller, the punitive damages applied only to Miller.
Id.These damages were based on the jury finding that Hudson and Miller "had acted 'with
malice' and intended to cause injury to the plaintiff . . . .Id." The award was reduced to $5
million in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages because the trial judge
"concluded that the award [was] based [in] part on passion .... Jury Award Is Sharply Cut
in Hudson AIDS Suit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1989, at A7, col. 4.
Although interesting in several respects (amount of damages and recovery despite the lack
of an infection), the Hudson case does not directly address the issue examined by this
Note-the unintentional transmission of AIDS.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). A finding of duty is actually a
simple determination that liability should be imposed in a given fact pattern. See Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14,
22 (1976) (endorsing the view that "legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but
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evaluate a variety of factors when considering the duty issue,64 the
central focus will be on the foreseeability of harm. 5 Under this analysis, a duty will only be found to exist where the defendant should
have foreseen harm to someone. 6 Several courts have recognized
merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed
for damage done.").
64. For example, the courts of California have indicated that seven factors are determinative of the existence of a duty:
(1) foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2) degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury; (3) closeness of connection between defendant's conduct and injury
suffered; (4) moral blame attached to defendant's conduct; (5) policy of preventing
future harm; (6) extent of burden to the defendant and the consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach;
and (7) availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 706 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983); see also Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 22 (citing the same list).
Although this Note focuses on the foreseeability issue, see infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text, the other determinative factors may be analyzed to add additional support to the
imposition of a duty to avoid transmitting HIV. For example, it has been argued that the
policy of preventing future harm weighs heavily in favor of imposing a duty. See Note, Negligence, supra note 17, at 932 (arguing that the future harm includes human fatalities and
economic costs). Additionally, the extent of the burden to the defendant is minimal when
compared to this potential harm. See id. at 933.
It has also been argued that the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct weighs
in favor of imposing a duty. See id. at 932. One commentator has suggested that the criminalization of sodomy and the immoral status of homosexuality support this conclusion. Id. Hopefully, this narrow minded and archaic type of analysis will not appear in AIDS litigation.
Rather, as the same commentator also suggested, the moral blame attaches to the act of
"knowingly or negligently infect[ing] an unknowing sexual partner .... IId.
The unavailability of insurance, as well as problems of inadequate coverage, have also
been cited as support for the imposition of a duty. See id. at 931. The argument on this issue
suggests that the government ends up bearing the cost of AIDS transmission, a cost which
should be shifted to the negligent party. See id. at 931-32. However, the fact that insurance is
equally unavailable to the negligent party implies that this argument is tautological because
the government would still bear the costs after they are shifted.
The remaining factors-degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered harm and closeness
of connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered-appear to be better
suited for argumentation in individual cases because they are subject to substantial variations.
See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (discussing damages); infra notes 83-91, 139-83
and accompanying text (discussing causation).
65. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (indicating
that "[t]he most important of these considerations in establishing duty is foreseeability.");
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968) (stating
that foreseeability has a "primary importance" in evaluating duty); Vu, 538 F. Supp. at 30-33
(focusing on foreseeability in the discussion of duty).
66. The foreseeability analysis essentially proceeds as follows:
[T]he court will determine whether the accident and harm was reasonablyforeseeable. Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the particular defendant as an individual would have in actuality foreseen the exact accident and loss; it
contemplates that courts, on a case-by-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances,
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that harm to the plaintiff is foreseeable when the defendant knows
that he has a sexually transmitted disease.6 7 Where a defendant is
not aware of his HIV infection, the assertion of foreseeability becomes more difficult.68 However, if the defendant was aware that his
conduct had created a high risk of infection, 69 the risk of transmitting the disease should be considered foreseeable. Furthermore, recognizing a duty in this situation is consistent with a policy that seeks
to deter the transmission of HIV, and thus prevent future harm.
Courts have already recognized a duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent transmitting venereal disease when awareness of the
infection is present. 0 Stated more generally, the duty owed by one
sexually active person to another is "the same one that every individual ... owes another: the duty to exercise ordinary care not to injure
others. 17 ' Extension of this duty to cases involving AIDS victims
will decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have
foreseen. The courts thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and
unexpected.
Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (emphasis in original).
67. See, e.g., B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 142, 538 A.2d 1175, 1179 (1988) (finding that
"[o]ne who knows he or she has a highly infectious disease can readily foresee the danger that
the disease may be communicated to others with whom the infected person comes in contact."); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 107-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that the
risk of transmitting herpes was foreseeable where the defendant knew she had the disease, and
where she should have known that transmission was possible). See generally Casenote, Tort
Liability for the Transmission of Genital Herpes: A New Legal Duty? R.A.P. v. B.J.P. 428
N,W2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), 12 HAMLINE L. REv. 91 (1988) (authored by Marcia
Braun).
68. See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
absent a demonstration that the respondent had actual or constructive knowledge that he had
the AIDS virus, the defendant owed no legal duty to the plaintiff).
69. For a discussion of the risk involved and the defendant's ability to recognize that
risk, see infra notes 105-108, 115-20 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., B.N., 312 Md. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1179 (finding a duty to "take reasonable precautions-whether by warning others or by avoiding contact with them-to avoid transmitting" herpes, when the defendant was aware of the infection); R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 10607 (explaining that "[t]his rule is based on the simple principle that people who have dangerous contagious diseases have a duty to protect others who might be in danger of infection.").
71. Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 539, 333 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1985); cf. Smith v.
Baker, 20 F. 709 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884) (holding that the plaintiff could maintain a cause of
action for negligent transmission of whooping-cough); Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, 210,
23 N.W. 632, 634 (1885) (allowing a negligence action against a hotel-keeper who kept his
hotel open with knowledge of the prevalence of small-pox on the premises); Hendricks v.
Butcher, 144 Mo. App. 671, 674, 129 S.W. 431, 432 (1910) (holding that any person afflicted
with small-pox has the duty "to so conduct himself as not to communicate this disease to
[other persons], after he becomes aware that he is afflicted with it.") Kliegel v. Aitken, 94
Wis. 432, 435, 69 N.W. 67, 68 (1896) (sustaining a cause of action for the negligent transmission of typhoid fever, and stating that "[t]he general principle is well established that one who
negligently-that is, through want of ordinary care-exposes another to an infectious or conta-
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who know that they have the disease has been anticipated by several
commentators.7 2 Ultimately, however, the question will focus not
upon whether a duty should be established, but rather upon what
standard of conduct is sufficient to meet the established duty of reasonable care. 3 Therefore, recognizing a duty of reasonable care in
cases where knowledge of the HIV infection does not exist would not
be overly intrusive if the acceptable standard of conduct is set at an
74
appropriate and reasonable level.
B.

Standardof Conduct

Given the general duty of reasonable care, an appropriate stan-

dard of conduct can be set through four different methods: direct
establishment by legislative enactment or administrative regulation;75 adoption by a court from legislative enactments or administrative regulations which do not specifically provide the standard;7 6
establishment via judicial decision;7 7 or application to the facts by
the trial judge or jury when none of the other methods are available.7 8 At least one court has applied a statute prohibiting the transgious disease, which such other thereby contracts, is liable ... in the absence of contributory
negligence or assumption of the risk.").
72. See, e.g., Baruch, supra note 17, at 174 (indicating that the lethal nature of AIDS
increases the likelihood that such a duty would exist); Hermann, supra note 16, at 89 (concluding that the possibility of infecting one's sexual partner is "easily foreseeable" when HIV
infection is known); Note, You Never Told Me, supra note 17, at 542-44 (examining the
precedent supporting a duty to avoid transmission of AIDS); Note, Tort Liabilityfor AIDS?,
supra note 17, at 972 (arguing that the public policy to reduce the spread of AIDS would
support finding such a duty); Note, Interspousal Transmission, supra note 17, at 904 (suggesting such a duty in the marital context); Note, Negligence, supra note 17, at 928-33 (analyzing the imposition of a duty in AIDS transmission cases).
73. In negligence cases the duty does not vary and the important focus is on what standard of conduct is necessary to fulfill this duty:
It is better to reserve "duty" for the problem of the relation between individuals
which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other, and to deal
with particular conduct in terms of a legal standard of what is required to meet the
obligation. In other words, "duty" is a question of whether the defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the
duty is always the same-to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in
the light of the apparent risl. What the defendant must do, or must not do, is a
question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy the duty.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 53, at 356.
74. For an evaluation of the potential standards of conduct, see infra notes 100-38 and
accompanying text.
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285(a) (1965).
76. Id. § 285(b).
77. Id. § 285(c).
78. Id. § 285(d).
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mission of a venereal disease to set an appropriate standard.79 The
79. Maraham v. Maraham, 123 A.D.2d 165, 170, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (1986). See
generally Gostin & Ziegler, A Review of AIDS-Related Legislative and Regulatory Policy in
the United States, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 5, 12 (1987) (evaluating the possibility of
criminal sanctions for HIV transmission).
HIV transmission has already been specified as a criminal offense in a number of states.
The scope of conduct deemed to be criminal varies among these statutes. Florida finds criminal
conduct where a person (1) has an HIV infection, (2) knows he is infected, (3) has been
informed that the virus may be communicated through sexual intercourse, (4) has sexual intercourse with another person, and (5) does not inform that person of the presence of HIV and
does not receive informed consent to sexual intercourse. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West
1989). This offense has been classified as a first degree misdemeanor, id. § 384.34, punishable
by imprisonment for a period up to one year, id. § 775.082, and a fine of $1,000. Id. §
775.083.
Georgia finds criminal conduct in a broader range of sexual relations by declaring that a
felony has been committed when any person who knows that they are infected with HIV:
knowingly engages in sexual intercourse or performs or submits to any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another person and
the HIV infected person does not disclose to the other person the fact of that person's being an HIV infected person prior to that intercourse or sexual act ....
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c)(1). The statue also forbids sharing needles or syringes without
disclosure of the infection, id. § 16-5-60(c)(2); prostitution without disclosure, id. § 16-560(c)(3); solicitation of sodomy without disclosure, id. § 16-5-60(c)(4); and blood or organ
donations without disclosure. Id. § 16-5-60(c)(5). The felony is subject to "imprisonment for
not more than ten years." Id. § 16-5-60(c).
Idaho has adopted an even broader provision:
Any person who exposes another in any manner with the intent to infect or, knowing
that he or she is or has been afflicted with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS), AIDS related complexes (ARC), or other human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) infection, transfersor attempts to transferany of his or her body fluid, body
tissue or organs to another person is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by
imprisonment . . . not to exceed fifteen (15) years, by fine not in excess of five
thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both such imprisonment and fine.
IDAHO CODE § 39-608(1) (1988) (emphasis added); see also id. § 39-608(2) (defining "body
fluid" and "transfer").
Several states have stricter mens rea requirements in their HIV transmission statutes.
Louisiaqa has made it a crime to "intentionally expose another to any acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus through sexual contact without knowing and lawful consent of
the victim." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.43.5(a) (West Supp. 1989). This crime is subject to a
$5,000 fine, ten years imprisonment, or both. Id. § 14.43.5(b). Oklahoma similarly has declared it a felony "for any person to engage in any activity with the intent to infect or cause to
be infected any other person with the human immunodeficiency virus." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1192.1(a) (West Supp. 1989). The crime is subject to five years imprisonment. Id. §
1192.1(b).
Utah has taken a different approach, supplementing a statute prohibiting the willful and
knowing introduction of "any communicable or infectious disease into any county, municipality, or community. . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (1984), with an additional statute declaring that AIDS and HIV "shall be considered communicable and infectious disease" for the
purposes of that chapter. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (Supp. 1989). The statute declares such
conduct to be a misdemeanor. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (1984).
Significantly, none of these statutes requires actual transmission of HIV as an element.
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general standard that has been proclaimed is that a "reasonable person" who knows or should know that they have a venereal disease
must communicate this knowledge to any sexual partner prior to sexual activities.80 The conduct of an AIDS victim who is aware of his
or her infection is clearly subject to the application of such a standard." l Where the defendant was unaware of his infection, however,
the appropriate standard of conduct will be more difficult to set. The
significant questions that remain are whether the courts will find
that a "reasonable person" who is unaware that they can transmit
HIV must take affirmative steps to prevent any possible transmission
or to inform their sexual partner of any existing risk; in what situations such steps should be taken; and what conduct is then sufficient
to meet such a standard.82
C. Causal Connection
Proximate cause is a limitation that courts place on an actor's
responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.8 3 Essentially, the
determination of proximate cause is an examination of the nature
and degree of the connection between the defendant's act and the
plaintiff's injury.84 In practice there are two requirements: the defendant's conduct must be the factual cause (cause in fact) of the
injury, 5 and he must be found to be legally responsible for the injury (proximate cause). 86
A factual cause is demonstrated where it can be said that "but
for" the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff would not have been injured.87 Assuming that the defendant can be isolated as the only potential source of the plaintiff's HIV infection, this requirement can
be easily fulfilled. A more difficult situation arises where the plaintiff
80. Comment, Kathleen K. v. Robert B.: A Cause of Action for Genital Herpes Transmission, 34 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 498, 516 (1984) (authored by Kimm Alayne Walton)
[hereinafter Comment, Kathleen K.]; see also Comment, You Wouldn't Give Me Anything,
Would You? Tort Liability for Genital Herpes, 20 CAL W.L. REv. 60, 69 (1983) (authored
by William S. Donnell) (explaining that the plaintiff must show, in a suit for negligent transmission of genital herpes, "that defendant knew, or should have known, of the possibility of
transmitting the virus and failed to warn plaintiff or take preventative measures.").
81. See Note, Negligence, supra note 17, at 936 (concluding that the duty to disclose
AIDS is supported by "social policy to prevent the spread of AIDS, the high medical costs, the
emotional trauma, and high death rate .... " (footnotes omitted)).
82. See infra notes 100-38 and accompanying text.
83. See W. PROSSER & W. KEErON, supra note 61, § 41, at 264.
84. Id. at 264.
85. Id. at 264-65.
86. Id. § 42, at 272.
87. Id. § 41, at 265.
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had multiple sexual partners who were all capable of transmitting
the virus.88 One possible solution would be to sue under an "alternative liability" theory in an attempt to switch the burden of proof to
the defendants.8 9
The proximate cause issue appears to be less difficult to establish in cases involving direct transmission between a carrier and a
victim. In determining whether or not the defendant should be legally responsible for the plaintiff's injury, it will probably be sufficient to show that a duty has been established and breached. 90 Proximate cause is only likely to play a significant role in litigation in
cases of third party harm, where a plaintiff seeks to recover from a
defendant who has transmitted HIV to the person who transmitted
the infection to the plaintiff.9 ' Such a situation is beyond the scope
of this Note.
D. Damages

To sustain a suit in negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that he suffered some form of actual loss. 9 2 Because AIDS involves
devastating symptoms and is usually fatal, 93 such a requirement
would seem capable of being fulfilled with relative ease.94 Given the
varying periods of incubation, 95 however, a plaintiff may be barred
from claiming the totality of his damages by an applicable statute of
limitations. Generally, statutes of limitations begin to run when some
88. See Corboy, supra note 17, at 42 (suggesting that "a plaintiff who has been sexually
active with numerous partners ... may have difficulty proving a particular party is the infector."); Note, You Never Told Me, supra note 17, at 547-48 (discussing various problems that
will exist in identifying the specific cause of AIDS infection); Note, Negligence, supra note 17,
at 939 (explaining that non-sexual causes of AIDS and the long incubation period may create
problems in proving actual causation); supra note 25 (indicating problems in AIDS litigation
which may be caused by the incubation period).
89.. See infra notes 139-83 and accompanying text (discussing the alternative liability
rule and how it would be applied in an AIDS transmission suit).
90. Note, Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 977-78 (arguing that the close resemblance
of the two issues will allow a finding of duty to satisfy the requirement of proximate cause);
see also Note, Negligence, supra note 17, at 939 (concluding that the proximate cause issue
will have "little impact" in cases involving a single plaintiff and a single defendant).
91. See id. (arguing that the third party should not be responsible to foresee the negligent act of his sexual partner, and therefore should not be held liable in this situation).
92. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 30, at 165.
93. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (reporting the estimations of death rates
for AIDS victims).
94. See Note, Negligence, supra note 17, at 940 (noting the ease of proving damages if
the plaintiff has AIDS, and suggesting the possibility of recovering for emotional distress).
95. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing the different stages of AIDS
and the possible incubation period).
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injury has occurred. 6 If the time of infection with the virus is considered to be the time of injury,97 a plaintiff whose infection is
known years before the effects of the disease fully manifests and develops may have difficulty recovering for all of his or her injuries.9 8
96. See Klein v. Dow Corning Corp., 661 F.2d 998, 999 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the
plaintiff's claim in negligence and strict liability accrued when her mammary prostheses implant burst, not when it was implanted); Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 374 Mass. 739,
742, 374 N.E.2d 582, 584 (1978) (holding that the statute of limitations in a products liability
suit begins to run when injury occurs, not when the product was manufactured or sold); White
v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 276, 18 A.2d 185, 187 (1941) (holding that the statute began to
run when the lightning rod in question caused a fire, and not when it was negligently installed
six years earlier); Martin v. Edwards Laboratories, 112 Misc. 2d 93, 98, 446 N.Y.S.2d 182,
186 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (finding injury to have "occurred upon the breakage of the artificial heart
valve," and holding that the statute of limitations began to run at that date).
Traditionally, statutes begin to run at the time the plaintiff was hurt:
We further hold the cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations began to
run from the time plaintiff was hurt. The "time plaintiff was hurt" is to be established from available competent evidence, produced by a plaintiff or a defendant,
that pinpoints the precise date of injury with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty.
Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 956, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905 (1981) (explaining the
rule within the context of an asbestos injury).
97. It can be argued that the injury in an AIDS case occurred when HIV was transmitted, not when ARC or AIDS ultimately developed. This would be consistent with some available precedent concerning the injection or inhalation of hazardous substances. See, e.g., Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 781, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922
(1979) (endorsing the view "that when chemical compounds are injected into a person's body,
the injury occurs upon the drugs [sic] introduction, not when the alleged deleterious effects of
its component chemicals become apparent."); Schwartz v. Hayden Newport Chem. Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (barring an action in negligence and breach
of warranty under a three year statute of limitations where plaintiff received an injection in
1944, lost an eye because of a carcinoma discovered in 1957, and commenced a cause of action
in 1959), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270
N.Y. 287, 301, 200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936) (indicating that in a suit against an employer for
negligent failure to protect employees from injury through dust inhalation, "[tihe injury to the
plaintiff was complete when the alleged negligence of the defendant caused the plaintiff to
inhale the deleterious dust.").
98. See Baruch, supra note 17, at 188 (arguing that such a rule even hurts plaintiffs
who become aware of the risk of AIDS, because they would be forced to litigate based on
conjecture, thus "compromis[ing] the amount of recovery he could receive."); Note, Negligence, supra note 17, at 943 (indicating that "inequitable results" would occur if the statute
ran from the date the plaintiff was exposed to HIV).
The problem of recovery was overcome in the Rock Hudson case, where Marc Christian,
who had never tested positive for AIDS, was awarded $14.5 million in compensatory damages
for emotional distress and $7.25 million in punitive damages. Hudson's Lover Wins $7 Million
More, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1987, at A7, col. 3. The jury found that Hudson and his staff
conspired to keep the fact that Hudson had AIDS from Christian. Id., col. 4; see also Jury
Award Is Sharply Cut in Hudson AIDS Suit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1989, at A7, col. 4. It
seems unlikely that a plaintiff would be this successful where such a conspiracy was not present, or where the defendant was not a wealthy celebrity.
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Therefore, alternate methods of dealing with such statutes should be
examined when considering AIDS litigation. 9
IV. SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS

A. Standard of Carefor Unaware AIDS Victims
Application of the available precedent in the area of tort liability for venereal disease transmission seems to be limited to cases
where the defendant was aware of his infection. 100 However, most
persons who are HIV infected are not aware of their infection and do
not demonstrate any recognizable symptoms, although they can still
transmit the disease.' 0 ' Therefore, an application of negligence law
that requires knowledge of the infection would not support an imposition of liability in most cases involving HIV transmission.
Given the apparent inapplicability of current rules, a new standard of conduct should be set for persons who have engaged in high
risk conduct, but do not know whether they are infected with HIV.
The acceptable standard of conduct should be viewed as an external
imposition,
based on societal demands rather than personal morality.10 2 The basic principles involve a balancing of the recognizable
risk involved with a particular course of conduct and the social utility of that chosen conduct. 03 This will necessarily involve an evaluation of alternate courses of action as compared with the risk and
utility of the chosen conduct. 04
The risk of contracting AIDS varies according to the type of
99. See infra notes 184-203 and accompanying text (analyzing potential rules to expand the plaintiff's ability to recover for injuries detected after the traditional statute of limitations has run).
100. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (examining the available precedent
concerning liability for the transmission of venereal disease).
101. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining the different stages of AIDS
and the incubation periods involved).
102. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,supra note 61, § 31, at 169 (arguing that "[t]he
standard of conduct imposed by the law is an external one, based upon what society demands
generally of its members, rather than upon the actor's personal morality or individual sense of
right and wrong.").
103. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the following:
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of
harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of
such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of
the particular manner in which it is done.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
104. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 31, at 172 (discussing the implications of alternative courses of conduct).
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activities in which a person chooses to participate. 0 5 People engaging in "high risk" activities face a significantly greater chance of
becoming infected, 0 6 and therefore a greater chance of transmitting
HIV.10 7 Particularly dangerous activities include homosexual relations with multiple partners and sharing needles with other intravenous drug users.' 08 If a person's conduct places him at a high risk of
transmitting HIV, one might argue that he should be required to
determine whether he actually carries the virus,10 9 use a condom
during intercourse to protect his partner," 0 and/or notify potential
partners of his prior sexual conduct, drug use or other risky
activities."'
Although even an increased risk of HIV transmission may remain statistically low,"' the potential significance of the injury may
be so great that failure to address the risk would still be considered
negligence."13 With AIDS, the most frequent degree of injury is
death." 4 Thus, a low probability of transmission should not be prohibitive of a cause of action, especially where that probability is increased because of high risk activities.
An important factor used in evaluating the "risk" of particular
conduct is the extent to which such a risk was recognizable to the
defendant." 5 Generally, a person is expected to recognize that his
conduct involves the risk of causing the invasion of another's interest,
given the attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowl105.

See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text (discussing the AIDS statistics and

describing what constitutes high risk conduct).
106.

See supra note 44 and accompanying text (listing groups of individuals considered

to be at high risk).
107. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (indicating that the nature of an individual's activities enhances the chance of transmission).

108.

See Swenson, supra note 2, at 191 (reporting that in some areas of New York City

as many as 80% of intravenous drug users are infected).

109.

See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.

110.

See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.

111.

See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.

112.
113.

See supra note 49 (indicating a low rate of transmission, even for careless persons).
See Clark's Adm'r v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 289 Ky. 225, 230-31, 158 S.W.2d 134,

137 (1942) (holding that despite the fact that lightning was an act of God and not a significant probability, failure to properly insulate an electric company meter box ground wire was

still negligence); see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 31, at 171 (analyzing
situations where the chance of an occurrence is low but the potential damage is high).

114. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (reviewing death rates for AIDS
victims).
115. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 31, at 170 (explaining that "[t]he
idea of risk in this context necessarily involves a recognizable danger, based upon some knowledge of the existing facts, and some reasonable belief that harm may possibly follow.").
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edge, intelligence, and judgment of a reasonable man.116 More specifically, the person is presumed to know the qualities, characteristics
and capacities of things and forces that are common knowledge in
the community."17 An issue in AIDS negligence litigation may be
whether the risk of HIV transmission is recognizable within the common knowledge of the community."' Given the massive efforts undertaken to educate the public about the risk,11 9 the defendant's subjective lack of knowledge about AIDS seems unlikely to hamper
litigation. 2 °
In determining the social utility of a given conduct, the court
must evaluate the social value that the law attaches to the interest
which is to be advanced or protected by the conduct, and the extent
to which that interest can be protected by some other conduct. 2 '
The possibility that the interest protected is a personal right of pri116.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 289 (1965).

117. Id. § 290.
118. The lack of available information about AIDS in 1985 has prevented at least one
plaintiff from recovering for negligent transmission. See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 444
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "[b]ased on the affidavits submitted by respondent's physicians, and the information available to the general public [at the] time.., it was not reasonable for respondent to have constructive knowledge that he might have AIDS, or that he was
capable of transmitting the disease to appellant" where the parties were having sexual relations from May 1984 to May 1985).
Part of the common knowledge problem is likely to be found in the conflicting information
available about AIDS. See generally Grady, supra note 8, at 60 (discussing some of the conflicting information about AIDS). Some of the informational problems can be blamed on certain groups of people who insist that AIDS is a vengeful act of God meant to punish homosexuals and drug users. Swenson, supra note 2, at 198 (asserting that "[t]hese attitudes are
reminiscent of the nineteenth-century view that poverty was a moral failing and that cholera
was God's wrath on the poor."). Because of such problems, "the fear of transmissibility of
HIV infection is tremendously exaggerated in the public's psyche." Id. These fears may benefit
potential AIDS plaintiffs if they raise the "common knowledge" view of transmission risk, thus
raising the standard of conduct required to avoid such risk.
119. See 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 1,at 14 (noting that "[e]ducational campaigns are
directed to the general public and those in risk groups for AIDS, encouraging them to discontinue any practices that have been linked with the possible spread of AIDS."); SURGEON GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 3, at 28 (stressing the importance of education and predicting that
such information could save "as many as 12,000 to 14,00 people ... in 1991 from death by
AIDS.").
120. In fact, failure to know about the risks of AIDS may itself be sufficient to constitute negligence. Failure to investigate risks is sufficient to impose liability in some situations:
It is enough that [the defendant] should realize that his perception of the surrounding circumstances is so imperfect that the safety or danger of his act depends upon
circumstances which at the moment he neither does nor can perceive. In such case it
is negligent for him to act if a reasonable man would recognize the necessity of
making further investigation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 comment j (1965).
121. Id. § 292.
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vacy will be evaluated later in this Note."22 Beyond this, the evaluation of social utility can only be completed by considering the possible alternate courses of action. 2 ' Three prevalently cited alternate
courses of action which might logically be required are: submitting
to tests for HIV infection, using condoms during sexual relations and
informing potential sexual partners of current AIDS risk by describing previous sexual and drug related activities. 124
A defendant could arguably be found to have been negligent if
he failed to be tested for HIV as a precaution for future sexual relations, after having participated in high risk activities. AIDS testing
is often readily available at no cost. 12 5 Assuming that it is not substantially difficult to obtain a test, and that testing is effective, 2 6 the

protective interest served by such testing would outweigh the interests preserved by not requiring testing. 27 A rule which requires test-

ing for all high risk individuals in order to avoid potential tort liability would, however, closely resemble mandatory testing schemes,
which have not been widely supported. 2 s In fact, even the Surgeon
122. See infra notes 240-50 and accompanying text.
123. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 31, at 172.
124. See 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 1, at 21 (advocating these and other methods of
reducing the risk of transmission); SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 16-17 (promoting mutually faithful monogamous relationships, blood tests for those who have been involved in high risk activities and condom use during vaginal and rectal intercourse).
125. See PUB. HEALTH SERV., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORTS ON
AIDS PUBLISHED IN THE MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT: JUNE 1981
THROUGH MAY 1986, at 168 (1987) (noting that by December of 1985, the CDC had helped
to establish 874 testing sites in the United States). But see Policano, The AIDS Test; An
Elusive Procedure, Access & Confidentiality, COMMONWEALTH, Feb. 26, 1988, at 102
(describing the author's personal frustration while attempting to locate an AIDS testing site,
including difficulty in trying to reach the New York City AIDS Hotline).
126. This may be an open question, since there is still much dispute over the accuracy of
AIDS testing. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (evaluating the process and accuracy of AIDS testing). Therefore, the reliability of AIDS testing would probably be an important issue of fact if a plaintiff argued that testing is the appropriate standard of conduct, or if
the results of an AIDS test were used to show injury to the plaintiff.
127. One possible interest to be preserved in not testing for AIDS is avoiding the emotional impact of a false positive test. Such test results do occur with relative frequency. See
supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
128. See Banks & McFadden, Rush to Judgment: HIV Test Reliability and Screening,
23 TULSA L.J. 1, 25-34 (1987) (evaluating mandatory screening, the potential discriminatory
uses of such screening, and relevant privacy concerns); Howard, HIV Screening: Scientific,
Ethical, and Legal Issues, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 601, 605 (1988) (suggesting that the "poor predictive value of HIV antibody" testing and the "adverse social consequences of mislabeling"
make compulsory or voluntary universal screening undesirable); Rosoff, supra note 12, at 83
(arguing that "massive population screening" should not be instituted until test accuracy can
be increased, confidentiality can be guaranteed, and education and counseling can be "integrated with the screening process ....
"); Note, Constitutional Rights, supra note 12, at
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General has opposed compulsory blood testing. 12 9 Given the concerns
of unmanageability and inadequate counseling, holding a high risk
defendant negligent for failing to be tested for HIV appears to be an
impracticable standard.
Alternatively, a person who frequently has sex, particularly anal
intercourse, may be found negligent if he fails to wear a condom
during subsequent sexual activities. Although estimates as to the effectiveness of condoms vary, 130 condoms certainly reduce the risk of
HIV transmission to some extent.13 ' Condoms lubricated with nonoxynol 9 spermicide may contain the added advantage of being able
to kill the virus that transmits AIDS, although that evidence is not
conclusive.'3 2 The most common "adverse interest" expressed concerning the use of condoms is simply that men do not like to use
them.13 3 This interest is not persuasive in comparison to the potential
consequences of unprotected sexual relations. However, condom use
the effectiveness
alone is an inadequate standard of conduct because
3
of such a precaution is, at best, questionable.1
Finally, a person who has engaged in high risk activity may
simply be required to reveal his participation in such conduct to potential sexual partners. This is the most attractive theory because it
is analogous to the available precedent dealing with venereal disease
transmission and is supported by public policy. Courts have sup1287-89 (concluding that the psychological trauma produced by false positives and privacy
concerns outweigh potential benefits from AIDS testing given the lack of casual contact transmission); Note, Characterizationand Disease, supra note 12, at 250 (criticizing "[t]he current
calls for mandatory AIDS testing" because they "have increased anxiety among gays who
perceive such measures to be a surrogate marker for their homosexuality.").
129. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 33. In addition to citing administrative and cost-related problems, the Surgeon General noted that "many who test negatively
might actually be positive due to recent exposure to the AIDS virus and [the test may] give a
false sense of security to the individual and his/her sexual partners concerning necessary protective behavior." Id. (emphasis in original).
130. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the predictions and uncertainty concerning condom effectiveness, and endorsing their use as a precautionary measure).
131. See supra notes 48-49 (discussing the effectiveness of condoms).
132. See Carey, supra note 48, at 83 (noting that the spermicide has been shown to kill
the virus in test-tube studies, and may be advantageous should the reservoir tip in the condom
become torn during sexual activities). A recent study conducted by three medical professors
found: "(I) latex condoms are impenetrable to HIV; (2) the spermicide nonoxynol 9, as proved
earlier, kills HIV in vitro; and (3) when a condom containing non-oxynol 9 in the tip is torn,
the spermicide kills the virus in two thirds of all cases." Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 2263.
133. Goode, supra note 43, at 85.
134. See Note, Negligence, supra note 17, at 936 (arguing that "[a] duty to warn of
possible transmission should exist even if a condom is worn since the possibility of transmission
is present even when a condom is utilized.").
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ported a duty to reveal an actual infection of venereal disease. 135 If
the courts require this type of disclosure when a typical venereal disease is present, it seems consistent to require disclosure of the
heightened possibility of an infection. Moreover, accurate disclosure
of sexual history has been widely promoted as a valuable weapon
against the spread of AIDS.13 The preventive effect of such conduct
appears to be much greater than whatever discomfort might be created.137 Although there may be equal protection arguments in response to any of these possible standards, 13 this standard of conduct
seems, on its face, to be the least intrusive, and to apply equally to
all persons similarly situated.
B.

Causation Among Multiple Defendants

The medical facts about AIDS present several problems of identification that the potential AIDS plaintiff must overcome in order to
be successful. Specifically, if the incubation period lasts several years
or the victim engages in sexual relations with multiple partners of
whom more than one turn out to be HIV infected, finding the spe135. See, e.g., Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 540, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1985);
B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 142, 538 A.2d 1175, 1179 (1988).
This was the issue in the Rock Hudson case, discussed supra note 62. The trial court
found Hudson and his secretary to be liable because they kept Hudson's disease a secret in
hopes of continuing the relationship between he and the plaintiff, Marc Christian. Rock Hudson's Lover Wins Suit, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1989, at A22, col. 5; see also Rock Hudson's
Lover Wins, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 27, 1989, at 6, col. 3 (explaining that Hudson and his staff
conspired to hide his AIDS infection from Christian, and that they had a duty to warn Christian about the disease).
136. See 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 1, at 21 (listing abstinence from sexual contact
with persons with unknown past history and current health status first among methods to reduce the risk of AIDS); SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 17 (urging that "[i]f
your test is positive or if you engage in high risk activities and choose not to have a test, you
should tell your sexual partner."); Goode, supra note 43, at 85 (examining the process for
discussing such matters).
137. See Goode, supra note 43, at 85 (endorsing honest communication in sexual relationships despite any uneasiness which may exist); Note, Negligence, supra note 17, at 936
(noting that "a duty to warn of the possibility of a deadly risk is a minimal burden on the
individual.").
An analogous argument has been presented in the context of a negligence suit for herpes
transmission:
[The] defendant's pursuit of personal gratification has no social utility whatsoever,
and the resulting harm is affliction with an incurable, socially stigmatizing, and
emotionally crippling disease. The interest that the herpetic seeks to protect-his
own sexual satisfaction-is not legally cognizable. Thus, liability would almost certainly flow under the negligence balance.
Comment, Kathleen K., supra note 80, at 517 (footnote omitted).
138. See infra notes 251-60 and accompanying text (discussing the equal protection
ramifications of tort liability for AIDS transmission).
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cific tort-feasor responsible for the transmission may prove to be im-

possible.139 The most promising legal argument available to deal
with this problem can be found in the recent development of group
responsibility causation rules. 140 The rule of "alternative liability,"
first developed in the landmark case of Summers v. Tice,"4 should
prove to be a valuable weapon in appropriate fact patterns. This
rule, subsequently codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 42
provides that
[w]here the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is
proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of
them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the
burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the
harm.143

The nationwide status of the alternative liability rule is difficult to
trace, with some states having clearly accepted the rule,'44 several
139. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulties multiple partners and the incubation period present in litigation of AIDS cases).
140. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 41, at 271-72 (analyzing modern rules of group liability); Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift From Individual
to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473 (1986)
(tracing the growth and examining the rationale of group responsibility rules).
141. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). The plaintiff in Summers was injured while
hunting quail with two other men, the defendants. Id. at 82, 199 P.2d at 2. The plaintiff was
struck in his eye and in his lip by bird shot discharged from a shotgun. Id. The two defendants
had both fired their weapons, identical 12 gauge shotguns both containing the same size shells.
Id. Both defendants were found to have acted negligently, but it could not be determined
which of them had fired the shot that injured the plaintiff. Id. at 83, 199 P.2d at 2. The court
held that the burden of proof should be shifted to the defendants on the issue of causation. Id.
at 88, 199 P.2d at 4. In justifying such a shift, the court said that the defendants were "both
wrongdoers-both negligent toward plaintiff. They brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve
himself if he can." Id.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965).
143. Id.
144. States that have accepted alternative liability in some form include: Alabama, see
Nelson Bros., Inc. v. Bushby, 513 So. 2d 1015, 1018-19 (Ala. 1987) (citing Summers to uphold a jury instruction allowing recovery absent direct proof that one defendant proximately
caused the injury); California, see Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 87-88, 199 P.2d at 4-5; Michigan,
see Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 331, 343 N.W.2d 164, 173 (formally approving
the theory in Michigan, and "fashioning and approving a new DES-unique version of alternative liability."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); New Jersey, see Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 219 N.J. Super. 601, 623, 530 A.2d 1287, 1298 (1987) (holding alternative liability
applicable "where one of a group of tortfeasors is responsible, in which case the burden shifts
to the other defendants to exculpate themselves."); Ohio, see Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co., 15
Ohio St. 3d 396, 397, 473 N.E.2d 1199, 1200 (1984) (finding alternative liability applicable in
a case against two ethyl acetate suppliers following an explosion of the product, and adopting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(B)(3)); and Oklahoma, see Hood v. Hagler, 606
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states specifically rejecting the rule,145 and the majority of states

having found its application to be unwarranted in the specific cases
where it was offered. 146 The policy justification behind alternative
liability is that innocent plaintiffs should not suffer because the nadefendants' conduct precludes discovery of the
ture of the culpable
147
actual cause.
P.2d 548, 553 (Okla. 1980) (shifting the burden of proof to defendant dog owners who negligently allowed their dogs to run free, when it was not clear which dog had bitten the plaintiff).
145. States that have refused to judicially adopt alternative liability include: Florida, see
Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting alternative liability because it imposes liability on innocent defendants "simply because they may not
be able to establish their blamelessness.") and Oregon, see Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 305 Or. 256, 271, 751 P.2d 215, 223 (1988) (refusing to judicially adopt alternative
liability because such action "requires a profound change in fundamental tort principles of
causation, an adjustment rife with public policy ramifications" and suggesting that the "legis...).
lature may study and adopt one or another such theory.
146. Many states have considered alternative liability when applicable fact patterns
have arisen, but have refused to fully accept the rule, or to apply it because of specific gaps in
the cases. Such states include: Arizona, see Porterie v. Peters, 111 Ariz. 452, 456, 532 P.2d
514, 518 (1975) (finding that the negligence of all defendants was not proven); Illinois, see
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 173 II1.App. 3d 1, 31-32, 527 N.E.2d 333, 352-53 (1988) (rejecting
alternative liability in a DES case where obtaining evidence would be difficult for all parties,
not all of the potential defendants were joined and where the theory would not allow apportionment of damages corresponding to the amount of DES each manufacturer produced);
Iowa, see Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 73-74 (Iowa 1986) (rejecting the
alternative liability theory in a DES case because not all possible defendants were joined);
Maryland, see Thodos v. Bland, 75 Md. App. 700, 715-16, 542 A.2d 1307, 1315 (1988) (rejecting the alternative liability theory in an automobile accident case where negligence of all
defendants was not shown); Minnesota, see Bixler v. Avondale Milles, 405 N.W.2d 428, 43031 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting the alternative liability theory where negligence was not
proven for any defendants, and not all possible defendants were joined); Missouri, see Zafft v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Mo. 1984) (holding that alternative liability "has not
achieved full acceptance in Missouri."); Nevada, see Kleitz v. Raskin, 738 P.2d 503, 509-10
(Nev. 1987) (refusing to shift the burden of proof when injury to the plaintiff could have
occurred in one of two automobile accidents that occurred one month apart from each other);
New York, see Centrone v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 114 Misc. 2d 840, 842, 452 N.Y.S.2d
299, 301 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding that alternative liability could not be applied where only
one of the defendants had been shown to have acted tortiously); Utah, see Weber v. Springville, 725 P.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Utah 1986) (declining to endorse alternative liability where
the plaintiff failed to bring into the lawsuit all of the potential tort-feasors); Washington, see
Foster v. Carter, 49 Wash. App. 340, 345, 742 P.2d 1257, 1261 (1987) (finding Summers to
be inapplicable when only one negligent defendant exists); and Wisconsin, see Collins v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 183-84, 342 N.W.2d 37, 46 (rejecting alternative liability in a
DES case where defendants were not in a better position to offer evidence, it was not guaranteed that all negligent defendants were joined and where the theory does not fairly apportion
damages among the defendants), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
147. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948). The same policy
rationale is given in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
[T]he reason for the exception is the injustice of permitting proved wrongdoers, who
among them have inflicted an injury upon the entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape
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The potential application of alternative liability is easily understood in terms of a hypothetical. Imagine a situation where an AIDS
victim has had sexual relations with more than one HIV carrier during the time when he or she must have contracted the disease. 4" If
alternative liability was imposed, the burden would be shifted to the
defendants to establish that they could not have transmitted the disease to the plaintiff. 1 49 Those defendants failing to establish that
they could not have transmitted the disease would be subject to joint
and several liability for the plaintiff's damages. 50 Given the apparent difficulty of providing such proof, shifting the burden will most
likely guarantee the plaintiffs victory on the issue of causation. The
policy justification in an AIDS case is that the plaintiff should not
suffer a loss merely because the virus that causes AIDS has a unique
incubation period that renders identification of the transmitter impossible. Despite the appeal of such an argument, several potential
problems exist.
As a preliminary matter, the use of alternative liability has been
limited to situations where all possible causes of the plaintiff's injury
have been joined.' 51 Therefore, the AIDS plaintiff must determine
liability merely because the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm has
made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them has caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment f (1965); see infra notes 209-34 and
accompanying text (discussing situations in which the AIDS plaintiff does not appear to be
"entirely innocent").
148. See supra notes 18-20 (discussing potential causes of action in battery, fraud and
deceit or misrepresentation). For the purposes of this Note, it is assumed that none of the HIV
carriers knew that they had the infection.
The fact that the plaintiff had multiple partners may prove troublesome in establishing his
innocence. See infra notes 209-34 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the
plaintiff's conduct).
149. See supra text accompanying note 143 (presenting the alternative liability rule and
its effect).
150. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740, 822
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (explaining that those defendants who do not meet their burden are subject
to joint and several liability), affid 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1988).
151. See, e.g., Weber v. Springville, 725 P.2d 1360, 1367-68 (Utah 1986) (refusing to
apply Summers where the plaintiffs failed to join all of the potential tort-feasors-all of the
land owners at points where the plaintiff's child may have fallen into a creek); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment h (1965) (reporting that "[tfhe cases thus
far decided in which the rule [of alternative liability] ... has been applied all have been cases
in which all of the actors involved have been joined as defendants.").
Joining all potential causes has been a significant problem in attempts to impose alternative liability on DES manufacturers. See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 73-74
(Iowa 1986); Smith v. Eli Lilly Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 31-32, 527 N.E.2d 333, 352-53 (1988);
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 183-84, 342 N.W.2d 37, 46, cert. denied, 469 U.S.
826 (1984);. But see Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 331, 343 N.W.2d 164, 172-73
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every possible cause of the infection, and must join them all in the
lawsuit. This requirement may prove quite cumbersome given the
number of potential causes, some of which do not involve sexual activities."5 2 The possibility that situations may arise which call for relaxing this rule has been noted by some commentators, 15 3 as well as
the courts.15 4 In the products liability field, the "market share liability" rule has been developed to deal with such a problem.155 However, since the rule is by definition a products liability doctrine, 5 ' it
would seem to be inapplicable in the AIDS hypothetical. Creating
an exception to the general rule requiring all potential causes to be
joined in the suit may well require a showing of more distinguishing
characteristics than the facts provide. At the very least, there is a
strong comparative negligence argument against a plaintiff whose
conduct has been such that he does not even know all of the possible
causes of his infection.15 7 Where it is the plaintiff's conduct that
causes the lack of evidence on the causation issue, burden shifting
seems both inappropriate and inequitable. 58 Additionally, the de(1984) (modifying the alternative liability rule for use in a DES case).
152. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying cases using the alternative liability rule
have "involved conduct of substantially the same character, creating substantially the same
risk of harm, on the part of each actor." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment
h (1965). Thus, as the differences between the potential causes grow, the viability of a lawsuit
would be reduced.
153. The authors of the Restatement (Second)of Torts recognized the necessity of modifying this requirement:
It is possible that cases may arise in which some modification of the rule stated may
be necessary because of complications arising from the fact that one of the actors
involved is not or cannot be joined as a defendant .... The rule stated in Subsection (3) is not intended to preclude possible modification if such situations call for it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment h (1965).
154. See, e.g., Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 595, 689 P.2d 368,
377 (1984) (noting that there may be an exception to this requirement "where not all of the
defendants were joined but strong policy reasons and 'the single indivisible injury' or 'risk
contribution' rules could be applied.").
155. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-12, 607 P.2d 924,
937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-45 (finding Summers to be inappropriate in DES litigation and
holding that "[e]ach defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the
product which caused plaintiff's injuries"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). For a more
complete description of the rule, see Bush, supra note 140, at 1484-86.
156. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 41, at 271 (discussing
the application of the market share liability rule).
157. See infra notes 222-35 and accompanying text (analyzing the contributory negligence and comparative negligence arguments in an HIV transmission suit).
158. Alternative liability is a rule developed to protect innocent plaintiffs when the conduct of the defendants has made identification of the real cause difficult or impossible. See
supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the policy rationale of alternative liability).
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fendants are no longer in a better position to offer proof of causation,
because they would have no conceivable way to trace the plaintiff's
disease or to locate all of the potential causes. 159 Therefore, alternative liability seems to be a viable theory only where the AIDS plaintiff can identify all of the potential sources of transmission and join
them in the suit.
A second problem for potential AIDS litigants is the rule that
limits the imposition of alternative liability to situations where all of

the defendants can be shown to have acted negligently.160 Assuming
that the standard of conduct has been set at the level suggested by
this Note, 61 it is certainly possible that not all defendants will be
found to have acted negligently. If even one of the defendants was
candid and honest about his or her high risk activities, the plaintiff
would be unable to shift the burden of proof on causation. The result
would be the same if any of the defendants had not participated in
high risk activities, but had acquired HIV through non-negligent
conduct. Because alternative liability is used in an effort to place the
burden of proof of cause in fact on the wrongdoer rather than the
innocent plaintiff,6 2 it is consistent to deny application of the rule
The policy rationale would no longer be supported by shifting the burden of proof since the
plaintiff who cannot even be sure he has found all of the potential causes of his infection would
appear to have engaged in conduct that is far from "innocent."
159. Alternative liability was created on the premise that "[o]rdinarily defendants are in
a far better position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the injury." Summers v.
Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948). Where the plaintiff is in a better position to
offer such evidence, the policy rationale has not been satisfied.
160. In order to justify the imposition of alternative liability, the plaintiff must prove
that all of the defendants acted negligently:
The rule . . . applies only where it is proved that each of two or more actors has
acted tortiously, and that the harm has resulted from the conduct of some one of
them. On these issues the plaintiff has still the burden of proof. The rule stated has
no application to cases of alternative liability, where there is no proof that the conduct of more than one actor has been tortious at all. In such a case the plaintiff has
the burden of proof both as to the tortious conduct and as to the causal relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF ToRTs § 433B comment g (1965).

The failure to demonstrate tortious conduct on the part of all defendants has precluded, at
times, the application of alternative liability in Arizona, see Porterie v. Peters, Ill Ariz. 452,
456, 532 P.2d 514, 518 (1975); Maryland, see Thodos v. Bland, 75 Md. App. 700, 716, 542
A.2d 1307, 1315 (1988); New York, see Centrone v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 114 Misc. 2d 840,
842, 452 N.Y.S.2d 299, 301 (1982); Ohio, see Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 33
Ohio St. 3d 40, 44-45, 514 N.E.2d 691, 695-96 (1987) and Washington, see Martin v. Abbott
Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 592, 689 P.2d 368, 377 (1984); Foster v. Carter, 49 Wash.
App. 340, 345, 742 P.2d 1257, 1261 (1987).
161. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (arguing that the defendant should
be held negligent for failure to disclose participation in high risk activities).
162. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the policy rationale for al-
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when not all of the possible causes are, in fact, wrongdoers. Additionally, an individual should not be held responsible for an injury
caused by members of a group, when the individual is not a member
of that group.163 Thus, the use of alternative liability is further limited to situations where all of the defendants acted negligently.
The third, but less obvious, problem for AIDS litigants may be
the fact that alternative liability has traditionally been applied only
when defendants acted simultaneously.16 4 In the AIDS hypothetical,
the time period during which the plaintiff may have contracted the
disease could be quite lengthy.165 Even if an incubation period of
several years or longer is possible, the plaintiff would be required to
include all possible causes of his infection within that time period in
his suit.' 6 6 There are situations where all of the possible HIV transmitters may have acted in unison, 67 but it is more likely that the
possible causes will be separated by some period of time. One possible answer to this argument is that for the purposes of determining
who transmitted the virus, all of the acts in question should be considered to have occurred simultaneously.6 8 Additionally, the plaintiff
ternative liability); see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 41, at 271 (stating
that the goal of alternative liability is to have the failure of proof fall upon culpable defendants
as opposed to innocent plaintiffs).
163. See generally Bush, supra note 140, at 1484 (arguing that the alternative liability
rule "means that all but one in the group will pay for some other member's actions-a shift
from individual to group responsibility.").
164. Whether or not this is a formal requirement may be unclear, but it has been noted
that so far "[a]ll of these cases have involved conduct simultaneous in time, or substantially so
." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment h (1965).
At least one court has had the opportunity to examine this issue. See Kleitz v. Raskin,
103 Nev. 325, 738 P.2d 508 (1987). In Kleitz the plaintiff had a claim against a driver in one
car accident and a driver in a second accident that took place one month later. Id. at 325, 738
P.2d at 509. The court held that the plaintiff retained the burden of proof as to causation, id.
at 328, 738 P.2d at 510, but that after showing proof as to causation of some damages on the
part of both drivers, the burden would shift to the defendants to apportion damages. Id.
The court in Kleitz only discussed the issue of simultaneous action in a footnote, where it
indicated that alternative liability only applies "when two separate tortfeasors act near simultaneously and it is unclear which one of the two caused the injury." Id. at 328 n.2, 738 P.2d at
510 n.2.
165. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (examining the estimates concerning the
length of the incubation period, including one study finding a median time of 9.8 years).
166. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement that all
possible defendants be joined).
167. The clearest example would be a situation where the plaintiff and the defendants
engaged in some form of group sex. However, a complaint stemming from such an occurrence
would be prone to an assumption of the risk argument, see infra notes 210-221 and accompanying text, a contributory negligence argument, see infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text,
or a comparative negligence argument. See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
168. This is arguably consistent with a broad definition of simultaneous that is compara-
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may choose to argue that the requirement of simultaneous causes
should be abandoned in this case. It has been suggested that particular fact patterns may require a modification of the rule. 69 Assuming
that the time involved does not affect the ability to identify the specific cause of injury, the exclusion of alternative liability would still
render an innocent plaintiff helpless against culpable defendants. Judicial reaction to these arguments remains to be seen, but it would
be inconsistent with the policy justification for alternative liability to
allow defendants to be exculpated merely because their conduct was
not simultaneous, when the rule would be imposed if the exact same
conduct had been done simultaneously.
The final problem arises because AIDS may be contracted
through multiple exposures.170 In the hypothetical situation de-

scribed above, it may be possible that sexual contact with one of the
17 1
defendants would not have been sufficient to cause the infection.
Although it is unclear whether alternative liability can be utilized
when more than one defendant is the actual cause of injury,1 72 it is

consistent with the policy justification of the rule to shift the burden
of proof in a case where it is possible that only one, several, or all of
the defendants caused the harm. First, the nature of the injury (i.e.
the possibility that multiple exposures were required for transmistive in nature. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "simultaneous"
as "[a] word of comparison meaning that two or more occurrences or happenings are identical
in time."). But see WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2122 (1976) (defining "simultaneous" as meaning "existing or occurring at the same time .... "). For comparative purposes, the separate acts may be identical in time, in that they each occurred during the
time period where HIV transmission may have taken place.
169. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has once again left open the opportunity for
expansion of the rule:
It is possible that cases may arise in which some modification of the rule stated may
be necessary because ... of the effect of lapse of time .... Since such cases have
not arisen, and the situations which may arise are difficult to forecast, no attempt is
made to deal with such problems in this Section.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment h (1965).
170. See supra text accompanying note 42 (recognizing that the large volumes of blood
necessary to transmit AIDS may require multiple exposures).
171. See, e.g., Padian, supra note 42, at 790 (finding that multiple exposure to infected
sexual partners created a significant risk unlike general sexual activity).
172. The rule as stated seems to limit application of alternative liability to situations
where only one defendant is the actual cause. See supra text accompanying note 142 (stating
as part of the rule the requirement that "it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff
by only one of [the defendants] . . . ."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B
comment f (1965) (indicating that the rule "arises where the conduct of two or more actors
has been proven to be negligent or otherwise tortious, and it is also proved that the harm to
plaintiff has been caused by the conduct of only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to
which one." (emphasis added)).
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sion) should not preclude recovery from culpable defendants.1 73 Second, this situation presents an answer to the major objection to alternative liability; defendants who did not actually cause the injury
should not be made to share in the payment of the damages to the
plaintiff. 174 If it is possible that all of the defendants may have
shared in causing the injury, it is rational to hold them jointly and
severally liable.
Another option in the multiple exposure situation would be utilization of the "single indivisible result" rule." 5 This rule provides relief in situations where the type of harm caused by the tortious ac-

tions of two or more defendants are "by their very nature . . .
normally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division. ' 76 In these cases, the burden of proof is not shifted, but no
apportionment is made and each defendant can be held liable for the
entire harm. 7 This rule has been used in a variety of situations, 78
173. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the policy rationale for alternative liability).
174. See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(articulating such an objection).
175. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 52, at 347 (discussing
the "single indivisible result" rule).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment i (1965). The comment continues to explain that "[d]eath is that kind of harm, since it is impossible, except upon a purely
arbitrary basis for the purpose of accomplishing the result, to say that one man has caused
half of it and another the rest." Id.
177. Id.; see Bolick v. Gallagher, 268 Wis. 421, 427, 67 N.W.2d 860, 863 (1955) (holding that "where independent torts concur to inflict a single injury, each tort-feasor is liable for
the entire damage."), overruled on other grounds, Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 51
Wis.2d 281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971).
178. Common situations for the application of this rule include: accidents involving multiple vehicles, see Hackworth v. Davis, 87 Idaho 98, 105-07, 390 P.2d 422, 426-27 (1964)
(finding that the jury should have been instructed on the single indivisible injury theory where
plaintiff's car was struck head-on, and then struck from the rear by a truck); Arnst v. Estes,
136 Me. 272, 276, 8 A.2d 201, 203 (1939) (holding that the entire liability will only be incurred absent any logical basis for apportionment); Watts v. Smith, 375 Mich. 120, 125-26,
134 N.W.2d 194, 195-96 (1965) (applying the single indivisible injury rule to litigation stemming from two accidents in the same day); fires which merge and cause destruction, see Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 440-41, 179 N.W. 45, 49
(1920) (holding that "[i]f a fire set by the engine of one railroad company unites with a fire
set by the engine of another company, there is joint and several liability, even though either
fire would have destroyed plaintiff's property.") and medical injuries, see Blanton v. Sisters of
Charity, 82 Ohio App. 20, 24-25, 79 N.E.2d 688, 691 (1948) (upholding the conclusion that
both the hospital and the operating surgeon were negligent in causing the patient's death);
Brown v. Murdy, 78 S.D. 367, 374, 102 N.W.2d 664, 667 (1960) (allowing two physicians to
be joined as defendants despite the fact that "the alleged negligence of the two tortfeasors took
place at different times and at different places [with] each doctor follow[ing] his own course of
treatment ....").
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and can be imposed when any defendant alone could have caused the
harm, or where the conduct of both was necessary to bring about the
harm.179 This rule carries one more significant advantage for the
AIDS plaintiff in that it does not require that the acts in question
occur simultaneously. 180 Thus, if an AIDS plaintiff can show
through medical testimony that his injury was caused by multiple
exposures to the defendants' HIV infections over a period of time,
joint and several liability could be imposed.
The most significant objection to the use of alternative liability
in AIDS cases may be that the rule would serve to reduce, if not
eliminate, the deterrent effect of such litigation. Assuming that liability for the negligent transmission of HIV is imposed as a method
of encouraging safe sexual practices, it would seem inconsistent to
allow a shift in the burden of proof where the plaintiff has himself
engaged in high risk group activities.' 81 Additionally, there may be
some hesitance on the part of the courts to allow any AIDS victim to
recover damages, particularly given the apparent public fear of and
disdain for AIDS victims.'8

2

This general hesitance, along with the

desire to encourage safe sexual practices on the part of all individuals, will most likely limit success in HIV transmission suits involving
83
multiple defendants to situations that fit the rules analyzed above.'
C. Statutes of Limitations
It has been suggested that the lengthy incubation period that
AIDS victims experience between infection and symptoms may
cause them to discover the disease only after the statute of limitations has run on any potential claim.184 There has been a tremendous
increase in judicial acceptance of the discovery rule, which starts the
statute running when the plaintiff knew or should have known of his
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment i (1965).
180. Id. (concluding that "[i]t is not necessary that the misconduct of two or more
tortfeasors be simultaneous" and adding that "[o]ne defendant may create a situation upon
which the other may act later to cause the harm."); see also Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich.
425, 434-35, 108 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1961) (noting that "[t]he reason for the rule as to joint
liability for damages was the indivisibility of the injuries, not the timing of the various
blows.").
181. The goal of alternative liability is to have the failure of proof fall upon culpable
defendants, as opposed to the innocent plaintiff. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note
61, § 41, at 271.
182. See supra note 118 (discussing public misinformation and the exaggerated public
fear concerning AIDS).
183. See supra notes 140-80 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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injury.' 85 Although the nature of the AIDS injury is analogous to
the typical discovery rule situation, imposition of this rule may prove
difficult because the traditional rule for venereal disease cases has
been that the statute runs from the time of infection."88 The current

discovery rule trend, accompanied by the difference in incubation periods between AIDS and other venereal diseases, mandates a move
away from the traditional rule. In an HIV transmission case, the
knew or should
statute should begin to run at the time the plaintiff
187
have known that he developed the HIV infection.
185. The discovery rule has been applied in a variety of situations including negligent
accounting, see Sato v. Van Denburgh, 123 Ariz. 225, 227, 599 P.2d 181, 183 (1979) (holding
that the "cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known, of the defendant's negligent conduct."); negligent preparation of
a tax return, see Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 366, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (1967)
(concluding that the statute of limitations began to run when the negligent act was "discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered."); medical malpractice, see
Kaufman v. Taub, 87 Ill. App. 3d 134, 138, 410 N.E.2d 114, 118 (1980) (running of the
statute of limitations in a claim of negligent treatment by a dentist from the point at which the
plaintiff gained knowledge of the injury and became aware that someone else might be responsible for it); and negligent architecture, see Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 463, 150
N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967) (holding that in an action against an architect for negligent design of
the plaintiff's home, the discovery rule applies).
Applications of the discovery rule, which should be analogized to the AIDS situation,
have occurred in the area of toxic torts. See, e.g., Dawson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 543 F. Supp.
1330, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying the discovery rule in a suit against DES manufacturers); Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1110, 751 P.2d 923, 927, 245 Cal. Rptr. 658,
662 (1988) (holding that the statute begins to run in a DES case when the plaintiff "suspects
or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing .... "); Nolan v. Johns-Manville
Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 169-71, 421 N.E.2d 864, 867-68 (1981) (supporting the discovery
rule in a suit against an asbestos manufacturer); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170,
173-74 (N.H. 1977) (endorsing the discovery rule in a suit against the manufacturer of a
defective oral contraceptive); Coyne v. Porter-Hayden Co., 286 Pa. Super. 1, 6, 428 A.2d 208,
210 (1981) (approving the discovery rule in the context of asbestos exposure).
186. See, e.g., Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340-51 (Wyo. 1979). In Duke the plaintiff was treated for gonorrhea in May of 1970. Id. at 338. In 1973 she began to develop a pain
in her lower right side and sought medical attention. Id. at 338-39. Eventually, exploratory
surgery was performed and it was concluded that the plaintiff had developed sear tissue adhesions due to the gonorrhea infection. Id. at 339. Her pain would return in a cyclical fashion
throughout her life. Id. The court held that the three year statute of limitations of New York,
Virginia, and Pennsylvania all precluded her cause of action for negligent infliction of gonorrhea. Id. at 340-51 (analyzing the statutes of limitations and choice of law problems).
In the court's analysis of the New York statute of limitations, it concluded that the statute began to run "[a]t that time [the defendant] introduced into the body of the plaintiff
infectious pus producing bacteria known as gonococci, which causes the disease of gonorrhea."
Id. at 346; see also supra note 97 (analogizing to cases involving the injection or inhalation of
hazardous substances).
187. Cf. DiMarco v. Hudson Valley Blood Servs., 147 A.D.2d 156, 160-62 542
N.Y.S.2d 521, 524-25 (1st Dep't 1989) (holding that the development of AIDS resulting from
exposure to contaminated blood falls within the discovery rule for "latent effects of exposure to
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Assuming that the statute does not begin to run until discovery
has or should have occurred, the plaintiff who discovers his HIV infection may be precluded from recovering for damages manifested
when or if he develops ARC or AIDS. This type of problem has had
major significance in the area of toxic substance litigation.1 88 Courts
have countered this problem by allowing claims for present damages
and fear of future harm, 8 ' allowing recovery for substantial chances
of future harm,19 0 or permitting a claim for present damages and
allowing a second suit if further damage develops.1 9'
Several courts have allowed recovery for the fear of future harm
in addition to present injuries.9 2 Such recovery has been limited to
any substance" in N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c); Prego v. City of New York, 147 A.D.2d
165, 175-76, 541 N.Y.S.2d 995, 1002 (2d Dep't 1989) (holding that the development of AIDS
resulting from a misplaced, HIV-contaminated needle falls within the discovery rule in N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c).
188. Cf. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 26 (5th ed. Supp.
1988) (arguing that in cases where some injury has been discovered, such as asbestosis, but
more serious injuries are still possible, such as cancer, the combined principles of the discovery
rule and res judicata could eliminate any claim for the later injuries).
189. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir.
1986); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414 (5th Cir. 1986); EaglePicher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 528-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
190. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1986); Jackson,
781 F.2d at 394.
191. See. e.g., Herber, 785 F.2d at 79; Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 320-21; Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 520.
192. See, e.g., Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 318 (allowing recovery for reasonable and genuine
fear of contracting cancer where the plaintiff had been exposed to dripolene); Jackson, 781
F.2d at 414 (permitting recovery for fear of developing cancer when asbestosis was already
present); Eagle-Picher Indus., 481 So. 2d at 528-89 (allowing a cause of action for fear of
cancer).
At least one court, however, has rejected a cause of action based on "AIDS-phobia." See
Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1987). In Doe the Supreme
Court of Kings County, New York rejected an "AIDS-phobia" claim which had been added to
a divorce action by the wife because the husband had admitted homosexual conduct. Id. at
1016, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 596. The Court had a number of objections to the cause of action. The
Court felt that the claim was an attempt to "circumvent the dictates of equitable distribution
.... " Id. at 1018-19, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 597-98. The claim was distinguished from "cancerphobia" cases because no actual injury had occurred and because the plaintiff was not subjected to regular check-ups to track the potential for disease. Id. at 1019-20, N.Y.S.2d at 598.
Additionally, the Court appeared hesitant to punish disclosure of homosexual conduct, which it
felt was "a responsible action of preventing any potential spread of the AIDS virus." Id. at
1021, N.Y.S.2d at 599. Finally, the Court rejected the proximate cause analysis, finding that
"the claim in this matter is a possibility, based on a potential, based on a possibility." Id.
Where the defendant actually has AIDS or and HIV infection, the case for "AIDS-phobia" may be much stronger. Surely the plaintiff in such a case could argue that HIV antibody
testing is required and, therefore, there is a clear proximate cause to the fear. However, this
rule would still create a disincentive to inform a partner of high risk activity or HIV infection.
Such a rule is undesirable if the goal of litigation is to promote responsible sexual practices.
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situations where "the plaintiff's mental suffering is accompanied by
a physical injury, or when the plaintiff establishes the defendant's
misconduct to have been wilful, gross, or wanton.' 93 This seems
consistent with the general rule that even a slight impact and injury
can warrant recovery for emotional distress caused by fear. 9 4 In
AIDS litigation, HIV infection itself should be sufficient to establish
a reasonable fear of AIDS.' The problem with these types of damages may well be that recovery for fear would be substantially less
than recovery for symptoms, should they actually develop.' 96
The second possible solution is to allow recovery for the increased probability that AIDS will be contracted. This would be
analogous to medical malpractice decisions which have allowed recovery for the decreased chance of survival. 197 The more similar
cases, such as toxic exposure, have also resulted in such recovery at
times. 198 Since seventy percent of those infected with full-blown
AIDS die within two years of diagnosis,' 99 and since there is only a
two to five percent survival rate for those diagnosed between 1978
and 1983,200 a reasonable probability of death may be easy to

demonstrate once AIDS has been diagnosed. However, it would be
more difficult to justify the recovery of damages where the only present harm is HIV infection, because the majority of those victims
apparently will not develop AIDS.2 01
193.

Jackson, 781 F.2d at 414.

194. See Herber, 785 F.2d at 85 (holding that the infiltration of the defendant's lungs
with asbestos fibers constituted an impact sufficient enough to allow a claim for fear of can-

cer). The analogous argument is that infiltration of HIV into the plaintiff's body constitutes a
sufficient impact.

195. See Note, Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 196-201 (arguing that HIV infection is
sufficient to meet the physical injury requirement, and that a fear of AIDS would be a reason-

able consequence of HIV infection).
196. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 54, at 360-61 (noting that such
harm is "often temporary and relatively trivial," with many courts unwilling to open the door

to fraudulent claims).
197.

See, e.g., Waffen v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 799 F.2d

911, 919 (4th Cir. 1986) (arguing that a "cause of action may be brought under Maryland
law for loss of a substantial possibility of survival ....

").

198. See, e.g. Herber., 785 F.2d at 81 (allowing such a claim when future harms can be
expected to flow from present harms with reasonable probability); Jackson 781 F.2d at 412-13
(indicating that the jury is to evaluate the medical testimony concerning the reasonable
probabilities). But see Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (arguing that such recovery would run afoul of public policy and would result in inequi-

table results).
199.

See supra text accompanying note 7.

200.

Brown & Cronin, "Surviving is What I Do", TImE, May 2, 1988, at 62.

201.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the statistics at each stage of
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The third option is to allow a second suit if the full-blown AIDS
and the accompanying symptoms develop. Again, such rules were
first developed in the area of toxic torts.202 Application of this rule in
AIDS litigation would be a recognition that HIV infection and "fullblown" AIDS are distinct injuries, and that separate suits can be
maintained. 03 Assuming that the plaintiff is physically and mentally
able to pursue litigation once AIDS is fully developed, allowing a
second suit would provide the best solution to the statute of limitations problem because it would increase the chances that such HIV
victims who later develop AIDS would receive full compensation.
V.

DEFENSES AND FURTHER COMPLICATIONS

In addition to the arguments already discussed in this Note, the
defendant in an HIV transmission suit has a variety of other arguments at his disposal. First, the defendant may argue that the nature
of the plaintiff's conduct was such that the plaintiff assumed the risk
of contracting HIV, 204 or was guilty of contributory negligence. 205
Arguments that traditionally fall under either doctrine may ultiAIDS infection).
Recovery for prospective harm has been limited to situations where the chance of such
harm is greater than 50%. Cf. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137-38
(5th Cir. 1985) (indicating that the plaintiff with a less than 50% chance of contracting cancer could probably not meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, and thus could not
recover for the prospective disease). But cf. McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421, 426
(E.D. Va. 1962) (awarding damages for a 3-25% chance that the plaintiff would develop
epilepsy); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 614, 664 P.2d 474, 487 (1983)
(holding that a cancer patient could maintain his cause of action where a hospital's negligence
had reduced his chance of survival by 14%). If the 50% standard is applied, an HIV infected
plaintiff would be unable to recover because his chance of contracting AIDS appears to be
only 20-30%. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Herber 785 F.2d at 82 (holding that a cause of action for cancer does not
accrue until the person discovers, or should have discovered, that he has cancer); Hagerty v. L
& L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that the development of
cancer can lead to an independent cause of action); Eagle-PicherIndus., 481 So. 2d at 524-26
(rejecting the imposition of damages for potential future harm in an asbestos case, and keeping
the opportunity of a second suit open); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556,
568, 495 A.2d 495, 502 (1985) (recognizing asbestosis and asbestos-related cancer as two
independent injuries). In Eagle-PicherIndus., the court kept the opportunity of a second suit
open in order to reach a compromise between the plaintiff who might otherwise be precluded
from full recovery of damages and the defendant who should not have to compensate unless an
actual injury occurs. 481 So. 2d at 524-26.
203. See Note, Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 207-08 (noting that such a solution is
only practical in jurisdictions that have adopted the discovery rule).
204. See infra notes 210-21 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text.
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mately be examined under a comparative negligence scheme.20z The
defendant may also assert that the plaintiff's conduct was in fact
illegal, thus barring him from recovery. 207 Alternatively, the defense
may center around the protection of the defendant's own rights, including privacy rights, 0 8 and equal protection rights.209
A. Assumption of the Risk
In general terms, the assumption of the risk defense bars recovery where there has been "knowledge of the danger and voluntary
acquiescence in it" 210 by the plaintiff. In a jurisdiction that continues
to recognize assumption of the risk as a viable defense,211 the defendant in an AIDS negligence suit is likely to argue that the plaintiff was aware of the risk of infection through sexual contact.212 Such
an argument will be even more persuasive if the plaintiff's contact
with the defendant can be said to constitute "high risk" conduct.
This is essentially an "implied assumption of the risk" argument.21 3
The first requirement of such a defense is that the plaintiff must
"know that the risk is present, and he must further understand its
nature ....

214

It has been held, however, that this must be knowl-

edge of a specific risk, not knowledge of a general danger. 2 -5 The
plaintiff should not be held to have knowledge of the specific risk
unless he knows of the defendant's previous conduct,21 6 or where the
206. See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
207.

See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.

208. See infra notes 240-50 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 251-60 and accompanying text.
210.

W. PROSSER &

W.

KEETON, supra note 61, § 68, at 482.

211. See id. at 493-95 (analyzing the recent trend to eliminate assumption of the risk as
a defense or to significantly limit its application). See generally Kionka, Implied Assumption
of the Risk: Does it Survive Comparative Fault?, 1982 S. ILL. U.LJ. 371 (discussing assumption of the risk, opposition to the defense, and its current application in products liability
cases); Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full
Preference, 67 B.U.L. REV. 213 (1987) (discussing the move away from and analyzing the use

of assumption of the risk).
212. Baruch, supra note 17, at 185 (noting that this argument is likely to center on the
fact that AIDS risks have been widely publicized).
213. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 68, at 484 (indicating that this is
the most common assumption of the risk argument, where consent to assume the risk is "to be

implied from the conduct of the plaintiff under the circumstances.").
214.
215.

Id. at 487.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965); see, e.g., Garcia v. City of

South Tucson, 131 Ariz. 315, 319, 640 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that "[a]
general knowledge of 'a danger' is not sufficient, but rather plaintiff must have actual knowl-

edge of the specific risk that injured him and appreciate its magnitude.").
216.

But see Baruch, supra note 17, at 185-86 (arguing that the risk of AIDS in some
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contact with the defendant itself constitutes high risk activity since
the risk of AIDS is significantly higher for people who engage in
high risk group activities. 17 This is also consistent with the standard
of conduct advocated earlier in this Note."" Once the defendant has
disclosed his or her high risk group background, the plaintiff should
have knowledge of the specific risks entailed. At this point the defendant is not negligent, and the plaintiff assumes any risks if he or
she proceeds with sexual activities.
The second requirement for this defense is that the plaintiff's
choice to assume the risk "must be free and voluntary." 21 9 Such voluntary assumption must be indicated by "some manifestation of consent to relieve the defendant of the obligation of reasonable conduct." 22 0 Although the decision to have sex would appear to be a
sufficient manifestation of consent, there is some precedent holding
otherwise.22 1 However, where the plaintiff's conduct is "high risk" in
nature, it is clearly reasonable to conclude that he has manifested
such consent. Therefore, assumption of the risk should not be a problem absent facts which indicate that the plaintiff realized the specific
risk of AIDS.
B.

Contributory Negligence

The defense of contributory negligence consists of a showing
that the plaintiff's own conduct fell below the standard it should
have met for his own protection, and that such a failure was a legal
cause of the injury.2 22 Under a traditional approach where contributory negligence completely barred the plaintiffs claim, 223 the effect
could be devastating. A plaintiff who did not request information on
the defendant's health and experiences, who did not use a condom,22 4
communities, such as San Francisco, may be high enough to support an argument that the

plaintiff had enough information to constitute knowledge of a specific risk of contracting the
disease).

217. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing high risk group activity).
218. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (advocating disclosure of high risk
activity as the acceptable standard of conduct).
219. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 68. at 487.
220. Id. at 490.
221. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276
(1984) (finding that consent to sexual intercourse was not a bar to recovery where herpes was
fraudulently concealed).
222. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 65, at 451.
223. Id. at 452.
224. Cf. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 645, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 621
(1980) (holding that the father of a child could not escape responsibility where the mother had
made false and intentional misrepresentations that she was using birth control, because he was
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or merely participated in high risk activities, could potentially be denied any recovery. Such analysis might be inevitable under a system
that extended the standard of conduct as suggested by this Note.225
One possible answer to the contributory negligence defense is
the argument that there is generally no duty to anticipate the negligence of others.226 This argument is unpersuasive because failure to
appreciate a risk which would be apparent to a reasonable person is
sufficient to constitute contributory negligence.227 In addition to the
risk of contracting AIDS, the plaintiff may be risking the spread of
AIDS if precautions are not used. 2 If the plaintiff has engaged in
high risk group activities prior to contact with the defendant, the
contributory negligence argument may be overwhelming. The best
hope for potential AIDS plaintiffs lies in the fact that defendants are
usually evaluated at a higher standard of conduct, 229 or in the fact
that more than forty states have instead adopted a comparative negligence system. 230
C. Comparative Negligence
Under a "pure" comparative negligence rule the plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to his own fault.2 3' Therefore, in a
suit for negligent transmission of HIV, the plaintiff's failure to inquire, failure to use a condom or participation in high risk activity,
would be weighed against the negligent action taken by the defendant (which may include failure to disclose his own infection). In a
also in a position to take precautions); Baruch, supra note 17, at 186 (arguing that Stephen K.
amounts to a judicial warning to use condoms).
The official position taken by the Surgeon General is that "[u]nless it is possible to know
with absolute certainty that neither you nor your sexual partner is carrying the virus of AIDS,
you must use protective behavior." SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (emphasis in original). If this standard was set, failure to use a condom or question your sexual partner might always be considered contributory negligence.
225. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (advocating disclosure of high risk
activities as the acceptable standard of conduct).
226. See Walton, Kathleen K. v. Robert B.: A Cause of Action for Genital Herpes
Transmission, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 498, 530 (1984) (arguing that in the context of tort
liability for herpes transmission to anticipate a risk to one's self should not be required).
227. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 65, at 460 (indicating an overlap with
the assumption of risk defense).
228. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (concluding that even those
couples with "mutually faithful monogamous relationships" are not fully protected from AIDS
unless they have been both been faithful for "at least five years").
229. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 65, at 454-55.
230. Id. § 67, at 471.
231. Id. at 472.
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"modified" comparative negligence jurisdiction, the plaintiff may be
barred from recovery if his negligence is greater than that of the
defendant, or if they are equally at fault.282 It is necessary, therefore, to show that the plaintiff's conduct was less culpable than the
defendant's. The most promising argument for the plaintiff on this
issue seems to be that failure to learn of one's own infection is more
culpable than a failure to know of a partner's infection. Additionally,
the plaintiff may argue, as he would against an assumption of the
risk defense, that he did not have adequate "knowledge" of the
risk. 233 The plaintiff may also respond, as he would to a basic contributory negligence defense, that the defendant is the more culpable
party. 234 The ultimate effect of comparative negligence will likely depend on the specific set of facts involved and the degrees of culpability that can be assessed, given the nature of both the plaintiff's and
the defendant's conduct. Specifically, the conduct of both parties
should be examined to determine whether or not it was "high risk"
in nature. Where the plaintiff's conduct has been such that he increased his own risk of contracting HIV, the amount of possible recovery may well be reduced, 235 but it seems unlikely that the defendant will escape all liability.
D. Illegality
In states with criminal statutes prohibiting fornication, adultery,
or sodomy, those laws may be used as defenses to a tort action involving HIV transmission. 23 6 Given the Supreme Court's recent ruling that states may constitutionally prohibit consensual homosexual
sodomy,23 7 attempts to apply these laws seem particularly likely.
Faced with a plaintiff and a defendant who have both been involved
in the same illegal activity, however, courts seem persuaded to hold
against the more culpable party.238 In a situation where both parties
232. Id. at 473 (noting that the precise effects of the rule depend on the particular
jurisdiction involved).
233. See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text (explaining the argument as an
answer to the assumption of the risk defense).
234. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text (examining the possible responses
to a contributory negligence defense).
235. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 61, § 67 at 468-75. For a description of
apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors as it relates to comparative negligence, see
ld. at 475-77.
236. See generally Baruch, supra note 17, at 188-92 (examining this type of defense).
237. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
238. See, e.g., Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 541, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1985)

(holding that "a person can recover in tort for injury suffered as a result of his own criminal
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have violated a sodomy statute, it seems likely that the plaintiff

could still recover against a more culpable defendant who had also
23 9
violated the statute and negligently transmitted HIV.
E. Privacy

Privacy rights may arise in two different contexts: as an argument to preclude judicial evaluation of sexual conduct between
adults or the choice of precautions exercised in such situations, 4 0

241
and as an evidentiary issue during the trial itself.
A defendant in a negligence action for HIV transmission may
argue that the court should not get involved in the sexual relations of
adults or, more specifically, should not require an individual to take

AIDS tests or to use specific precautions.2 42 Although courts have

refused to adjudicate decisions regarding the personal use of birth
control,2 43 there is some precedent to support judicial intervention in
the spread of venereal disease.244 Because of the current increase in
the spread of AIDS and the ever present public fear, it has been
suggested that HIV testing will be mandatory within a few years. 24
activity" in reversing summary judgment against the defendant in a claim charging negligent
and intentional infliction of herpes); De Vail v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936) (reversing a dismissal of a suit for damages based on fraudulent transmission of "crabs"
and holding that if both the plaintiff and the defendant participated in an illegal or immoral
transaction with equal guilt, the defendant's additional culpability in causing transmission of
the disease could not be ignored).
239. See Baruch, supra note 17, at 183 (arguing that "[tihe AIDS plaintiff may also
attempt to attack the illegality defense by pointing to its gross inequalities as applied to him as
well as its futility in an era of changing mores.").
240. See Comment, Kathleen K., supra note 80, at 531 (analyzing such a defense in a
herpes transmission lawsuit).
241. See infra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
242. See Comment, Kathleen K., supra note 80, at 531 (suggesting that this argument
in the herpes context "focuses on whether there should be judicial inquiry into sexual relations
between consenting adults.").
243. See, e.g., Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 645, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618,
621 (1980) (indicating that "as a matter of public policy the practice of birth control, if any,
engaged in by two partners in a consensual sexual relationship is best left to the individuals
involved, free from any governmental interference.").
244. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276
(1984) (indicating that the state interest in preventing the spread of contagious disease excluded such evaluations from protection under the constitutional right of privacy).
245. Swenson, supra note 2, at 197; see also Banks & McFadden, supra note 128, at
24-25 (reporting that compulsory screening already exists in the Naval Academy for all freshmen, in the State Department "for foreign service applicants, officers, and their dependents",
in the city of Nashville for potential employees of massage parlors, and in Nevada on a
monthly basis for prostitutes).
Mass screening has also "been suggested for prisoners, drug treatment centers participants, homosexual males, and food handlers. Screening has also been proposed for admission
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Advocates of privacy rights may consider the standard of conduct
suggested by this Note as an alternative which allows more free
choice on the whole than would mandatory testing. 46 As the epidemic grows, so does the likelihood that courts will support the public health needs over the privacy concerns involved.
Privacy may also become an evidentiary issue. Because anonymity is usually guaranteed in AIDS testing programs, 47 and because
there are substantial arguments in support of confidential treatment
of AIDS victims, 24 8 finding proof that a defendant has AIDS may be
difficult. Although there may be cases where the defendant's symptoms are severe enough to indicate an obvious case of AIDS, confidentiality statutes may preclude the use of medical records in court
when they are necessary.24 Eventually, courts may be forced to
make a policy comparison between the importance of confidentiality
and the importance of preventing the spread of AIDS. An important
factor in such an evaluation is the belief by some that any infringement on the confidentiality of testing is likely to decrease the number of people who are willing to be tested.250 If the overall policy
to hospitals or for obtaining medical insurance." Id. at 25.
246. Cf. Sullivan & Field, supra note 12, at 192 (arguing that civil remedies in tort are
"preferable to criminal prosecutions as a means for influencing behavior in this context because they lessen the risk of state intrusion into a sensitive area of private life.").
The deterrence value of civil remedies may be less substantial than that offered by the
criminal law. Id. The penalties are less severe, especially where the potential defendant has no
funds to be taken. Id. "The greatest advantage of civil over criminal enforcement is not that it
would provide more deterrence, but rather that it would impose less social harm." Id.
247.

100 QUESTIONS, supra note 1, at 15.

248. See generally Dickens, supra note 25, at 581 (analyzing the arguments in favor of
confidentiality for AIDS victims).
249. Contra Doe v. Roe, 444 N.W.2d 437, 440-43 (Wis. App. 1989) (holding that disclosure of the plaintiff's HIV test results to the defendant in a medical malpractice action did
not violate Wisconsin's confidentiality statute, and that the probative value of such evidence
outweighed any prejudice to the plaintiff).
A recent plea-bargain agreement in a New York case may have stalled the evaluation of
privacy rights for potential AIDS victims in that state. In the agreement, a "man whose used
hypodermic needle pricked the thumb of a transit officer" agreed to be tested for HIV in
return for a reduction in charges. Hays, Man Agrees to Police Call for AIDS Test, N.Y.
Times, Apr. !1,1989, at B3, col. 4. The controversial agreement prompted Richard D. Emery,
a civil rights lawyer, to comment that it "marked 'a sad day' for criminal justice and that it
highlighted the need to balance fears about AIDS with fairness and justice." Id. at col. 6.
250. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 30 (indicating that communities which require reporting of those infected with AIDS to public health authorities force
infected persons to "go underground out of the mainstream of health care and education" and
that such an effect has caused confidentiality to become the norm in health care); RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES, supra note 44, at 20 (advocating confidentiality and freedom from
discrimination as necessities in maintaining public confidence and broad participation in testing programs).
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goal of AIDS litigation is to decrease the spread of the disease,
courts may be forced to maintain the confidentiality of AIDS testing. This would further reduce the likelihood that a duty to be tested
could be established, and it would impose a significant evidentiary
hurdle under any standard.
F. Equal Protection

Legal responses to the AIDS crisis will certainly raise constitutional questions.251 A rule of law that places a higher burden on
those who participate in homosexual activities than those who are
active in similar heterosexual practices might be attacked as a viola-

tion of equal protection. 52 Some courts have found exclusion of
AIDS victims from normal classrooms to be a violation of equal protection. 53 Such decisions have been based on the fact that public
health concerns did not require the exclusion of HIV infected students from the typical classroom setting. 54 Despite these rulings,
251. See generally Merritt, supra note 12, at 739 (surveying the fourteenth amendment
implications of AIDS restrictions involving education, occupation, and quarantine); Orland &
Wise, supra note 12, at 137 (analyzing the application of privacy and equal protection rights,
among other constitutional issues); Rosoff, supra note 12, at 81 (arguing that "legislation,
regulatory pronouncements, and the development of common law through private litigation...
are being woven together.., to generate, both deliberately and inadvertently, a new synthesis
of expectations as to the proper balance between individual rights and governmental power.");
see also Smith, supra note 12, at 370 (discussing constitutional challenges in tort and medical
malpractice areas).
252. See Orland & Wise, supra note 12, at 149 (arguing that "[t]hese kinds of responses [to the AIDS crisis] present the core question of where, given the current state of
medical knowledge, the balance should be struck between the rights of AIDS victims and the
threat to public safety."); Rosoff, supra note 12, at 84 (suggesting that questions of AIDS
victim responsibility will require an evaluation of the traditional public health authority);
Smith, supra note 12, at 387-99 (analyzing tort liability for AIDS in terms of equal protection, right to trial by jury, and right of access to the courts).
253. See, e.g., Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit School Dist., 684 F. Supp.
1002 (S.D. Il1. 1988); Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); District 27
Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct.
1986).
254. See Robertson, 684 F. Supp., at 1006 (ruling against a rejection of mainstreaming
because the court found that "the harm to defendants in requiring that Jason be 'mainstreamed' is minimal at best. . . . the harm in sanctioning the continued isolation of Jason
clearly outweighs any harm to the defendants if a preliminary injunction issues."); Ray, 666 F.
Supp. at 1535 (finding that "actual, ongoing injury to Plaintiffs in this case clearly outweighs
the potential harm to others, and . . . the public interest in this case weighs in favor of returning these children to an integrated classroom setting.").
One interesting deviation from this analysis is a holding by a New York Supreme Court
that exclusion of AIDS victims from normal classrooms was underinclusive. District 27 Community School Bd., 130 Misc. 2d at 416, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 337. The court held:
Absent any rational basis for petitioner's proposed exclusion of only known AIDS
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equal protection is unlikely to preclude a court from adopting the
standard of conduct rules suggested by this Note" 5 for several reasons. First, homosexuals have not been recognized as a suspect
class.2 61 Without such a classification, strict constitutional scrutiny
will not be imposed on related legislation. 257 Second, courts have refused to find a constitutional right to engage in homosexual activities. 25 8 Third, legal principles that aim at particular conduct, as opposed to a certain "class" of individuals, are likely to pass a
constitutional test.259 Finally, the seriousness of AIDS as a health
cases or carriers of the virus, without imposing such exclusion in the case of ARC
patients or asymptomatic carriers who are as likely to present a risk of contagion
because they too are infected with HTLV-III/LAV, such a proposal must be
deemed a denial of equal protection of the laws.
Id.; see Schwarz & Schaffer, supra note 14 (discussing District 27 Community School Bd.).
In the case of tort liability for AIDS, an underinclusiveness argument may arise because only
the known risk groups are held to a higher standard of care. See supra notes 100-38 and
accompanying text (examining possible standards of care for high risk individuals). But in this
case, the difference is based on the risk of transmission presented. No such rationale is evident
in the education cases.
255. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (advocating disclosure of high risk
activity as the acceptable standard of conduct).
256. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979); Orland
& Wise, supra note 12, at 151.
Additionally, it has been noted that "homosexuality is not accepted by the majority in
America, [and] gay people have been the subject of widespread discrimination but are not
generally protected under civil rights laws ...." Joseph, supra note 12, at 1099. Given the
historical effect of popular views on homosexuality, it seems unlikely that equal protection
rights will be used to justify the rejection of a standard of conduct that is specifically applied
to people who have engaged in high risk conduct.
257. Desantis, 608 F.2d at 333; Hollowell & Eldridge, supra note 12, at 569; Orland &
,
Wise, supra note 12, at 151.
Instead, it is likely that the standard of review in equal protection cases brought by HIV
infected persons will be the "rational basis test." Hollowell & Eldridge, supra note 12, at 570.
Thus, afhy action with "a logical relationship to a legitimate state purpose" will be upheld. Id.
at 569. It has been noted that "the rational basis test is too deferential to be an effective
vehicle for HIV infected individuals mounting challenges to unfairly discriminatory laws." Id.
Certainly, tort liability for non-disclosure of high risk activity has a logical relationship to a
legitimate state purpose in that it is designed to promote candor and honesty in order to reduce
the spread of a deadly disease.
258. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (rejecting the argument
that there is a "constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy ....
");State
v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (upholding a statute prohibiting deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex because it applied equally to men and women).
259, See Baker v. Wade, 774 F.2d 1285, 1287 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding a Texas statute proscribing deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex because the
statute is "directed at certain conduct ....The statute affects only those who choose to act in
the manner proscribed." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
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threat is likely to prevent substantial constitutional protection for

homosexuals."'
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

In 1986 the Surgeon General reported that AIDS "is an epidemic that has already killed thousands of people, mostly young,
productive Americans. In addition to illness, disability, and death,
AIDS has brought fear to the hearts of most Americans-fear of

disease and fear of the unknown." ' ' Given the extent and magnitude of the AIDS crisis,262 the judicial system will inevitably be
forced to cope with it in many forms.263 In the area of tort law, the
courts must create rules which fairly adjudicate the rights of the victims and serve the public's interest by reducing the threat of AIDS.
260. See Orland & Wise, supra note 12, at 161 (citing the health risk, "traditional
deference accorded state action in the area of police power and public health," and historical
rejection of constitutional attacks on criminal statutes involving homosexuality as indications
that constitutional protection is unlikely to occur).
The desirable goal of reducing the risk of AIDS has prompted courts to reject equal
protection arguments in several areas, including: statutes regulating adult bookstores, see Doe
v. City of Minneapolis, 693 F. Supp. 774, 785 (D. Minn. 1988) (finding that "[t]he exemption
of certain structures, however, does not support an argument for deprivation of equal protection ...... 'the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to
admittedly serious problems.'" (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41, 47 (1986) (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976))));
Broadway Books, Inc. v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486, 490 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (concluding that
"the City is not prevented ...by the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause from
classifying and regulating adult-oriented establishments differently from other places of entertainment."); Suburban Video, Inc. v. City of Delafield, 694 F. Supp. 585, 593 (E.D. Wis.
1988) (holding the statute was not overbroad); and prison rules, see Cordero v. Coughlin, 607
F. Supp. 9, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (arguing that "AIDS victims are not a 'suspect class' and
therefore as long as there is a legitimate government end and the means used are rationally
related to that end, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated."); Powell v. Department of
Corrections, 647 F. Supp. 968, 971 (N.D. Okla. 1986) (noting that "[e]qual protection requirements will have been met if all members of the class (inmates who are known carriers of
HTLV-III) are treated equally and if the classification is not arbitrary."); Doe v. Coughlin, 71
N.Y.2d 48, 57, 518 N.E.2d 536, 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 788 (1987) (finding that exclusion
from prison conjugal visit program was not a violation of the inmate's rights where all persons
with communicable diseases were treated alike), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 196 (1988); see also
Muhammad v. Carlson, 845 F.2d 175, 177-79 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting a prisoners due process claim when he had been transferred to an AIDS-restricted section of the prison without
an opportunity to challenge his medical classification). But see Lopez v. Coughlin, 139 Misc.
2d 851, 854, 529 N.Y.S.2d 247, 249 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that the failure to allow an
AIDS infected prisoner to participate in prison release program was not rationally related to
the Department of Correctional Service's interest in the inmate's health and therefore
unconstitutional).
261. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
262. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
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Courts have the option of establishing a standard of conduct
that would require high risk group members to be tested for HIV
infection, 264 use condoms, 265 fully dic
disclose their prior high risk conduct,288 or any combination of these options. Creating a duty to disclose previous experiences and current risk of AIDS seems to be the
most reasonable compromise between the right to privacy 267 and the
need to encourage safe sexual practices. 268 Additionally, this responsibility is consistent with previous decisions holding that a duty exists
to inform sexual partners of the presence of venereal disease.2 69 Recovery under this rule is likely to be reduced through comparative
negligence where the plaintiff engages in high risk activity and
makes no attempt on his own part to reduce the risk of
transmission. 7
Where the plaintiff cannot be sure of the source of his infection, 271 alternative liability can be used to shift the burden of
proof. 7 2 This general rule must be limited to cases where all potential causes have been identified and joined,273 where all of the defendants have acted negligently,2 74 and where all of the defendants
are more culpable than the plaintiff.27 5 To hold otherwise would contradict a policy that seeks to discourage high risk activity. Additionally, it is fundamentally unfair to allow a plaintiff to prosper from
the very activity that caused the defendant to be held liable.
The unique nature of the AIDS incubation period2 76 presents
potential problems in dealing with applicable statutes of limitations. 277 Recovery for fear of AIDS,27 8 recovery for a substantial
likelihood of contracting AIDS,2 79 and recovery in a second suit
when AIDS does ultimately develop 20 all exist as alternative meth264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
supra notes 241-50 and accompanying text.
supra note 136 and accompanying text.
supra note 135 and accompanying text.
supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
supra note 25 and accompanying text.

272. See supra notes 139-83 and accompanying text.
273.

See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.

274. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
supra notes 95-99, 184 and accompanying text.
supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
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ods to approach the problem. In cases where the diagnosis of "fullblown" AIDS is clear but the symptoms have not fully developed,
the substantial likelihood of recovery should be utilized. 2"' At that
point, the likelihood that the disease will prove fatal is overwhelming.282 Where HIV is present, but AIDS has not developed, the possibility of a second suit should not be foreclosed.28 3 The plaintiff
should be entitled, ultimately, to full compensation for his injuries,
just as the courts allow full compensation for cancer. AIDS victims
24
should not be limited to a recovery for fear of the disease.
These are certainly not the only questions which may need to be
addressed before tort litigation for HIV transmission can be successful. However, tort litigation cannot be successful unless consideration
is given to the unique medical and social factors surrounding the
AIDS crisis. Such a conclusion is consistent with "the responsibility
of every citizen to be informed about AIDS and to exercise the appropriate preventive measures. "25
Richard Carl Schoenstein

281.
282.
283.
284.

See
See
1ee
See

285.

SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT,

supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
supra note 196 and accompanying text.

supra note 3, at 6.
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